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HIS annual survey of developments in Texas law, like other even-
year surveys I have prepared,' discusses first the legislative changes
relating to corporations and partnerships. In this instance the
changes are those adopted during the 1985 legislative session. The Article
then considers cases dealing with partnerships and corporations and dis-
cusses them under broad, topical descriptions.
I. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
In what has become virtually a biannual event, the Sixty-Ninth Texas
Legislature in 1985 enacted without change a bill relating to the Texas cor-
poration statutes developed by a committee of the Texas Bar Association
and formally endorsed by that Association. 2 The bill primarily makes
changes in the area of conflict-of-interest transactions between a director and
his corporation and in the issuance of series of securities authorized by the
board of directors rather than the shareholders. The legislature made other
less important changes; it addressed problems that arise when professional
corporations practice law in more than one state. It also enacted legislation
that allows banking corporations to register their names with the secretary
of state to prevent their use by ordinary business corporations. On the other
hand, for the second consecutive session, an important bill, strongly pushed
by the state bar and making significant changes in the procedures and under-
lying philosophy of the Texas Securities Act, narrowly failed of enactment.
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* A.B., Swarthmore College; J.D., University of Chicago School of Law. Benno C.
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1. Hamilton, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J.
235 (1984); Hamilton, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw.
L.J. 227 (1982); Hamilton, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34
Sw. L.J. 231 (1980); Hamilton, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
32 Sw. L.J. 221 (1978); Hamilton, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 153
(1976); Hamilton, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 146 (1975); Hamil-
ton & Shields, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 88 (1971).
2. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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A. Changes in the Financial Provisions of the Texas
Business Corporation Act
In 1985 the Texas Legislature adopted amendments to the Texas Business
Corporation Act clarifying the powers of the corporation and its board of
directors in the creation of new classes and series of shares. 3 Because of
ambiguities in the prior versions of the Texas Business Corporation Act the
question remains whether the changes constitute solely clarifications or
whether they also involve a substantive broadening of the power of corpora-
tions and their boards of directors. 4
The recent period of high interest rates caused a tremendous surge in the
development of new classes and types of shares used to raise capital. These
classes arose basically at the request of providers of capital to give desired
tax benefits or economic protection, and there appears to be no sound policy
reason to deny Texas corporations the power to create these novel classes.
Several popular variations of these novel shares exist.
(1) A corporation providing venture capital to another may request that
the transaction take the form of an issuance of a class or series of preferred
shares carrying a fixed dividend rate, but with the investor having the right
to "put" the shares back to the corporation at a fixed price at any time.
Such shares, usually described as preferred shares redeemable at the option
of the holder, enable the provider of capital to have essentially the benefits of
a holder of a demand note coupled with the receipt of periodic payments in
the form of dividends subject to the eighty-five percent dividend credit pro-
vided by the Internal Revenue Code.5 If the corporation ever omits the divi-
dend, the corporation that provided the capital may immediately exercise
the "put."
(2) For somewhat related reasons, a provider of capital may wish to
have the shares redeemed automatically upon some ascertainable event such
as changes in the prime rate or the passage of some specified period of time.
(3) Another variation often found in modern financing transactions in-
volves a class of preferred shares that contains affirmative or negative cove-
nants on the part of the corporation, the breach of which permit the holders
to exercise specified remedies and at the same time allows the remedies to be
waived by the vote or consent of some specified percentage of the holders of
the preferred shares. A typical example is a provision that allows the hold-
ers of a class of preferred shares to elect a majority of the board of directors
3. Id. arts. 2.12, 2.13.
4. Material prepared by members of the Committee of the State Bar working on these
amendments indicates that many Texas corporations were in fact issuing securities of the type
permitted in the amendments under prior law. Early drafts of the proposed legislation con-
tained provisions that clearly would have broadened this power in novel ways, e.g., to author-
ize the articles of incorporation to permit the board of directors to reclassify shares so as to
create new classes with preference over existing classes without shareholder approval and to
authorize the corporation to increase the percentage of shareholders needed to call a special
meeting. The committee eliminated these provisions in response to objections voiced during
internal committee debates.
5. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) (1985).
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upon the occurrence of a specified event of default and until the corporation
cures such default.
(4) Still another variation involves adjustable rate preferred shares. In
this variation the dividend rate adjusts periodically either by some automatic
formula or at the discretion of the provider of capital in light of changes in
some external index of interest rates, such as a bank prime interest rate or
the effective interest rate paid by the United States Government on treasury
bills or other federal securities.
In some cases attorneys were not entirely certain that Texas corporations
could create such novel classes of shares under the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act provisions relating to the creation of new classes of shares. 6 Of
equal practical importance, however, was the view that in publicly held cor-
porations utilizing such modern financing devices the statutes should permit
the board of directors to create "series" of securities with these rights with-
out shareholder approval. Sidestepping shareholder approval would avoid
the cost of holding a shareholders' meeting to approve each new specific
financing. The power of the board of directors to create new "series" of
shares under the Texas Business Corporation Act appeared to be narrower
than the power to create new "classes" of shares by amendment to the arti-
cles of incorporation; amendment, of course, requires a shareholder vote
while creation of a "series" does not.7
The 1985 amendments squarely address these problems. The legislature
amended article 2.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act relating to
classes of shares8 to state explicitly that variations in voting rights, including
special voting rights, may vary between classes of shares. In addition, the
legislature added the following sentence to this article:
Any of the designations, preferences, limitations, or relative rights, in-
cluding voting rights, of any such class of shares may be made depen-
dent upon facts ascertainable outside the articles of incorporation,
provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the
designations, preferences, limitations, and relative rights, including vot-
6. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.12 (Vernon 1980). A corporation could create
classes of shares "with such designations, preferences, limitations, and relative rights as shall
be stated in the articles of incorporation." Id. § A. Article 2.12, § B provides that "without
being limited to the authority herein contained, a corporation... may issue shares of preferred
or special classes ... subject to the right of the corporation to redeem any shares having a
liquidation preference at the price fixed by the articles of incorporation for the redemption
thereof." Id. § B. Although this language was written in an earlier era and contemplates
simpler types of preferred securities, it does not expressly prohibit the novel types of securities
described in the text.
7. Id. art. 2.13, § C permits the articles of incorporation to authorize the board of direc-
tors to create series of shares out of a class of preferred shares. Id. § A, however, requires all
shares of the class to have identical rights except in seven categories of rights: the rate of
dividend, the price at and the terms and conditions on which shareholders may redeem their
shares, the amount payable upon voluntary or involuntary liquidation, sinking fund provisions,
conversion privileges, and voting rights. The 1985 amendments to these sections not only
broadened the provisions relating to the variations in rights between classes of shares, but also
made the power of the board of directors to create series virtually as coextensive as the power
of the corporation to create classes of shares by amendment of the articles of incorporation.
8. Id. art. 2.12, § A.
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ing rights, of such class of shares is clearly and expressly set forth in the
articles of incorporation.9
The legislature amended article 2.13,10 relating to the power of the board
of directors to create series, in more fundamental respects. The same lan-
guage added to article 2.12 was added to article 2.13. Furthermore, the
amendment broadens both the permissible variations in provisions among
series and the power of the board of directors to create new series. The
amendment to article 2.13 § A also added the following sentence:
The articles of incorporation may provide that the relative rights and
preferences of shares of the same class may vary between series in any
and all respects, in which case shares of the same class need not be
identical so long as all shares of the same series are identical in all
respects. II
In addition, the article as amended expressly recognized that as between se-
ries the dividend rate, dates, terms, and other conditions with respect to pay-
ment and the nature of the dividend (i.e. cumulative, noncumulative, or
partially cumulative) may also vary from series to series.' 2 A new permissi-
ble variation among series allows the corporation to repurchase its obliga-
tions with respect to the shares of each series subject to the limitations of
article 2.03.13
The following provision in article 2.13 significantly broadened the power
of the board of directors to create new series of stock, if the articles of incor-
poration so authorize:
If the articles of incorporation shall expressly vest such authority in the
board of directors, then the board of directors shall have authority to
establish series of unissued shares of any or all preferred or special
classes by fixing and determining the relative rights and preferences of
the shares of any series so established within the limitations set forth in
this article and in the articles of incorporation, and to increase or de-
crease the number of shares within each such series; provided, however,
that the board of directors may not decrease the number of shares
within a series below the number of shares within such series that is
then issued.' 4
The power of the board of directors to increase or decrease the number of
shares of one or more already created series, in particular, is new to Texas
jurisprudence. The last clause of the quoted sentence prevents the board
from decreasing the number of issued shares of a series below the number of
outstanding shares of the series. Presumably, if the corporation has reac-
quired the shares and holds them as treasury shares, they still constitute
9. Id. § A (Vernon Supp. 1986).
10. Id. art. 2.13 (Vernon 1980).
11. Id. art. 2.13 (Vernon Supp. 1986). This amendment also recognized that the articles
of incorporation may restrict the permissible variations between series of shares, and if the
articles imposed such a restriction, all shares of the class must possess the same rights consist-
ently with that restriction.
12. Id. § A(l)-(2).
13. Id. §A(9).
14. Id. § B.
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issued shares. The corporation will therefore have to cancel them before it
may adjust downward the number of shares of that series.
The need for flexibility in the creation of new classes or series of shares to
meet financing requirements, however, represents only part of the story.
Classes or series of preferred shares also have a much more controversial
use. Publicly held corporations that fear an unwanted takeover attempt
have developed a variety of novel classes of preferred shares, usually called
"poison pills," ingeniously designed to make takeovers more difficult or even
impossible. One commonly used "poison pill" greatly increases voting rights
of a class of preferred shares in the event a person acquired more than a
specified fraction of the corporation's common shares. Another type of
"poison pill" grants its holders the right to "put" the shares at a relatively
high price to the corporation in the event of a substantial acquisition of the
corporation's common shares, or to substitute large amounts of debt securi-
ties for the preferred stock in the event of such an acquisition. Still another
type of "poison pill" permits a shareholder to acquire shares of the aggressor
at a bargain price in the event the aggressor acquires more than a specified
fraction of the target's common shares or in the event the aggressor seeks a
merger with the target (so-called "cross-over" rights). To say the least, the
creation of "poison pills" has been widely publicized, is highly controversial,
and is the subject of a great deal of corporate social policy and economic
analysis. Courts have questioned their lawfulness in several cases with con-
flicting results.15 State law presents one possible source of attack on these
15. The leading cases dealing with the issuance of "poison pills" from the standpoint of
the business judgment rule applicable to directors have arisen in Delaware. In Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
creation of a "poison pill" in advance of any specific takeover threat constituted the exercise of
reasonable business judgment. In M.zAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501
A.2d 1239 (Del. 1985), Revlon sought to avoid a takeover by Pantry Pride, a corporation
controlled by MacAndrews & Forbes, by entering into "lock up" and "no shop" options with a
proposed white knight at prices unfavorable to Revlon. Concluding that the board of directors
had changed its role from fending off an unwanted takeover to becoming an "auctioneer" to
dispose of Revlon or its various components, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
board's refusalto accept the highest offered price constituted a breach of duty to Revlon's
shareholders. Id. at 1250-51. A third important case involving a variant of the "poison pill" is
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Mesa launched a takeover fight
against Unocal, a major oil company. Mesa, the owner of 13%, of Unocal stock, offered $54
per share cash for 37% of the remaining stock. Mesa then announced that, if successful, it
would acquire the balance of the Unocal stock through a second-step merger in which the
remaining holders would receive highly subordinated securities, i.e., securities subordinated to
Mesa's extensive borrowings to raise the funds to pay for the 37% of Unocal to be purchased
for cash. Unocal responded by offering to repurchase the balance of its shares for debt securi-
ties worth $72 per share if Mesa acquired the controlling shares it sought. The repurchase
offer expressly excluded Mesa from its coverage. Unocal's board consisted of eight outside
directors and six inside directors. The outside directors met separately with financial advisers
and attorneys before the board unanimously approved the proposed transaction. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court upheld this defensive tactic, stating:
In conclusion, there was directoral power to oppose the Mesa tender offer, and
to undertake a selective stock exchange made in good faith and upon a reason-
able investigation pursuant to a clear duty to protect the corporate enterprise.
Further the selective stock repurchase plan chosen by Unocal is reasonable in
relation to the threat the board rationally and reasonably believed was posed by
Mesa's inadequate and coercive two-tier tender offer. Under these circum-
1986]
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"poison pills," particularly when the board of directors on its own, without
shareholder approval, creates new series of shares that dramatically affect
the rights of shareholders and tend to entrench the board in its control of the
corporation. 16
The committee of the Texas Bar Association that proposed the amend-
ments to articles 2.12 and 2.13 was clearly aware of the sensitive nature of
the "poison pill" issue, and the amendments it proposed appear to validate
all such securities from the corporate law standpoint. Presumably questions
relating to whether such an issue constitutes a valid exercise of business
judgment or is an improper self-dealing transaction will persist in connection
with "poison pills" adopted by Texas corporations. The amendments
adopted by the Texas Legislature, however, appear to foreclose the argument
that only the shareholders may approve a "poison pill" that dramatically
reduces the possibility of a successful outside bid for control of the
corporation.
B. Conflict-of-Interest Transactions
Conflict-of-interest transactions are either transactions between a corpora-
tion and one or more of its directors, or transactions between a corporation
and another business entity in which one or more of the corporation's direc-
tors have a financial interest in the other entity, usually a corporation or
partnership. 17 In 1985 Texas became the thirty-ninth state to adopt legisla-
tion dealing with this difficult and often sensitive problem. 1
8
stances the board's action is entitled to be measured by the standards of the
business judgment rule.
Id. at 958. If this decision is correct, boards of directors may be able to impose "poison pills"
against an already existing aggressor only if they can reasonably conclude that the offer is
unfair, inadequate, or coercive.
16. In Asarco, Inc. v. A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985), the court invalidated a
"poison pill" directed at a specific aggressor on the ground that the board of directors did not
have power to create a class of shares with voting rights that distinguished between a share-
holder with more than 20% of the voting shares and those with less than 20%. Id. at 477-78.
The board of directors created the poison pill in this case without shareholder consent. It
increased the voting power of non-20% shareholders fivefold when a shareholder pierced the
20% level while holding that shareholder to his original voting power. The court intimated
that the shareholders may have the power to create such preferred stock by an amendment to
the articles of incorporation, but held that the directors could not create such rights on their
own. Id. at 474. The court also relied on the fact that the board presented the amendment
authorizing the board of directors generally to create series of preferred stock to the sharehold-
ers solely in terms of permitting the corporation to meet financing needs without having to
obtain shareholder approval of amendments. Id. at 476; accord Ministar Acquiring Corp. v.
AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (board of directors of a target corporation
subject to a hostile tender offer exceeded its authority by issuing "rights" to its shareholders.
The rights could be exchanged for debentures that would create large amounts of corporate
debt and thereby deter tender offers). In Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d
707 (5th Cir. 1984), the court upheld a "poison pill" debenture/warrant issued by a Texas
corporation. Id. at 727. The court, however, did not principally address the question whether
arts. 2-12 and 2-13 authorized the preferred stock but rather whether the issuance constituted
an improper conflict of interest transaction.
17. For a discussion of the Texas law on conflict-of-interest transactions, see 20 R. HAM-
ILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 713-714 (Texas Practice 1973).
18. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.35-1 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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Many self-dealing transactions between a corporation and one or more of
its directors undoubtedly benefit the corporation. All corporate lawyers
have encountered situations in which a director has made assets available to
the corporation at cost, rendered managerial services without demanding
compensation, arranged for another business entity controlled by the direc-
tor to make available goods or services at a favorable price, or cosigned cor-
porate notes to assist the corporation in obtaining needed capital. Usually,
the director does not act through altruistic motives but to further his under-
lying equity interest in the corporation. Nevertheless such transactions obvi-
ously benefit rather than harm the corporation. On the other hand, conflict-
of-interest transactions often favor the director against the interest of the
corporation. This situation will most likely occur when the director has a
small or nominal interest in the corporation, so that his own personal gain
from the transaction will far outweigh "his share" of the harm to the
corporation.
Self-dealing transactions may also occur, however, when the economic in-
terest of the director in the corporation is significant. Corporate lawyers are
familiar with situations in which a director with a dominant equity position
in the corporation takes in-kind benefits such as expensive automobiles, free
lodging or travel, free use of hunting lodges owned by the corporation, or the
like. Transactions in which a director unloads assets of dubious value on the
corporation for inflated prices may also occur even when the director has a
substantial economic interest in the corporation.
Transactions may also occur that fit into neither of these extremes. For
example, the director may obtain an independent appraisal of a piece of
property and offer it to the corporation at that appraised price, or the entity
controlled by the director may sell property to the corporation at list price,
the same price at which the director would sell the property to anyone else.
In these arm's-length transactions the director treats the corporation in the
same way as he treats an unrelated person. The basic problem in the con-
flict-of-interest area involves segregating the harmful transactions and per-
mitting the corporation to avoid them if they involve abuse of the
relationship between director and corporation. The goal is to establish rules
that encourage desirable transactions while protecting the corporation from
the harmful ones.
The first common law cases during the nineteenth century took the posi-
tion that all conflict-of-interest transactions were voidable at the option of
the corporation. 19 This position has the undesirable effect of discouraging
desirable transactions, since the power of recission may often be exercised
with the benefit of hindsight. As a result, the case law that developed during
the twentieth century rejected the rule of automatic voidability and based
the power of recission on the fairness of the transaction to the corporation,
19. Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36 (1966). The language of some
Texas cases decided in the early years of this century takes the same position, but those cases
involved unfair transactions. See Canadian Country Club v. Johnson, 176 S.W. 835, 842 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1915, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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coupled with the requirement that a majority of the disinterested directors of
a majority of the shareholders approve the transaction.20 Although this rule
constituted a distinct improvement over the rule of automatic voidability, it
did not adequately deal with some situations. For example: How should a
court judge a fair transaction in which all the directors have an interest but
which is not submitted to the shareholders and therefore appears voidable
without regard to its fairness? When two large, publicly held corporations
have one director in common, should all or any business transactions be-
tween them be subject to ratification by either or both of the boards of direc-
tors? What standards should apply to determine the disinterestedness of a
director in family transactions (e.g., may a father who is a director vote on
his son's transaction)? Should the law allow shareholders who have an inter-
est in the transaction to vote to ratify that transaction? Should a low-value,
arm's-length transaction automatically meet the test of fairness? In 1973 I
attempted to encapsulate the Texas common law of conflict-of-interest trans-
actions in the following comments:
[C]onsiderable confusion exists in the case law as to the circumstances
which may validate such transactions. If one examines the results of
the cases (as contrasted with statements in the opinions), the following
comments accurately reflect most of the numerous Texas decisions:
1) If the court feels the transaction to be fair to the corporation, it
will be upheld;
2) If the court feels that the transaction involves fraud, undue over-
reaching or waste of corporate assets (e.g., a director using corporate
assets for personal purposes without paying for them), the transaction
will be set aside; and
3) If the court feels that the transaction does not involve fraud, un-
due overreaching or waste of corporate assets, but is not convinced that
the transaction is fair, the transaction will be upheld only where the
interested director can convincingly show that the transaction was ap-
proved (or ratified) by a truly disinterested majority of the board of
directors without participation by the interested director or by a major-
ity of the shareholders, after full disclosure of all relevant facts. 21
Even though these principles explain the results of most of the litigated
cases, they do not explain all of them. They also create practical problems.
First, the principles are not particularly helpful from the standpoint of the
corporation contemplating a desirable conflict-of-interest transaction. Sec-
ond, the principles do not guide an attorney faced with the problem of giving
advice to such a corporation as to how it should approve such a transaction,
or whether it can avoid a regretted transaction.
In the modern world conflict-of-interest transactions are more likely to
present problems in small or medium-sized corporations than in large, pub-
licly held corporations. Many publicly held corporations have adopted
codes of conduct for officers and directors. One of the major purposes of
20. See Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 293, 67 S.W. 92, 95 (1902).
21. 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 17, § 714.
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these codes is to eliminate all direct conflict of interest transactions. 22 In
very large, publicly held corporations the most likely conflict-of-interest
transactions that arise deal with compensation matters or with arm's-length
business transactions between two corporations with a common director.
These types of transactions are not likely to involve overreaching. In addi-
tion, a large number of other corporations have included in their articles of
incorporation or bylaws provisions that seek to deal with conflict-of-interest
transactions. These provisions usually purport to approve such transactions
as a matter of business judgment and give advance warning to shareholders
that the corporation contemplates engaging in such transactions.2 3 Courts
will not give literal effect to such provisions to validate unfair or fraudulent
transactions, but may uphold valid provisions despite possible adverse infer-
ences. 24 Because of these codes of ethics and exoneratory clauses, one would
expect conflict-of-interest litigation to continue to arise primarily in connec-
tion with transactions involving smaller corporations; one would further ex-
pect that they would continue to arise with regularity. Surprisingly,
although parties have litigated a large number of conflict-of-interest transac-
tions in Texas prior to 1970, the courts have seen virtually no Texas cases of
this type in the last fifteen years.
Most statutes dealing with conflict-of-interest transactions have been
adopted in the last ten years, primarily based on a Model Business Corpora-
tion Act provision added in 1966.25 In 1985 the Texas legislature adopted a
statute dealing with such transactions, based on the Delaware provision, 26 a
statute that is itself similar to the 1969 Model Act provision. The intention
of the Bar Committee presumably was to make available to Texas practition-
ers and Texas courts the Delaware case law construing this new provision
since the language adopted by the Texas draftsmen is identical to the Dela-
ware provision.
The statute actually adopted in Texas bears quotation in full:
A. No contract or transaction between a corporation and one or
more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other
corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which
one or more of its directors or officers are directors or officers or have a
financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, solely
because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting
of the board or committee thereof which authorizes the contract of
transaction, or solely because his or their votes are counted for such
purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of direc-
22. See Watt, Conflicts of Interest-Formalizing the Corporate Policy and Minimizing Ex-
posure to Conflicts of Interest, 17 Bus. LAW. 42, 43 (1961).
23. See 20 R. HAMILTON, supra note 17, §§ 724-725.
24. See Spiegel v. Beacon Participation, 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (1937).
25. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 37(a) (1966). The American Law Institute recodified
this section as § 41 of the 1969 Model Business Corporation Act and, in a considerably revised
form, as § 8.31 of the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act.
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983).
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tors or the committee, and the board or committee in good faith autho-
rizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative vote of a majority of
the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be
less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders
entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically
approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the
time it is authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors, a
committee thereof, or the shareholders.
B. Common or interested directors may be counted in determining
the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a
committee which authorizes the contract or transaction.27
This statute creates a safe harbor that makes a rule of automatic
voidability inapplicable to conflict of interest transactions that meet the re-
quirements of parts (1), (2), or (3) of article 2.35-1, section A. Literally, if a
conflict-of-interest transaction satisfies any one of these three parts, the
transaction is not void or voidable solely because of the conflict of interest or
solely because the interested director was present at the meeting, because he
participated in the meeting, or because he voted for the proposed transac-
tion. Since present court-developed law does not impose a rule of automatic
voidability, this statute at first blush seems to serve almost no purpose at all.
The advantage it provides, however, becomes apparent when one considers
the question from the standpoint of getting transactions approved. The stan-
dards for approving a transaction under sections A(1), A(2), or A(3) are
considerably less onerous than the formal requirements imposed by Texas
judicial opinion. For example, under section A(1) a majority of the disinter-
ested directors may validate a transaction if the nature of the transaction is
fully disclosed, even though the disinterested directors represent less than a
quroum, or in the case of a committee of the board of directors, the commit-
tee consists only of a single director.28 Under section A(2) the shareholders
may create the safe harbor if the nature of the transaction is fully disclosed,
even though the director with the conflict of interest owned all of the shares
voted in favor of the transaction.29 Finally, section A(3) validates a transac-
tion that is fair to the corporation even if the interested director makes no
disclosure of the material facts, and even if the interested director possesses
the decisive vote in approving the transaction. On the other hand, section
A(3) literally does not address transactions not passed on by the board of
27. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.35-1 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
28. Id. art. 2.36, § A. Prior to 1973 the only committee contemplated by the statute was
an executive committee consisting of two or more members. Texas Business Corporation Act,
ch. 64, art. 2.36, 1955 Tex. Laws (amended 1973).
29. Apparently, shares owned by the interested director may be counted. This conclusion
follows from a comparison of §§ A(l) and A(2). Section A(1) refers only to disinterested
directors, while A(2) refers to "the shareholders entitled to vote thereon" without any indica-
tion that interest is a ground for disqualifying any shares, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.35-1, § A(l)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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directors, a committee of the board, or the shareholders. For example, a
transaction that an officer of the corporation approves without action by the
board or by the shareholders is apparently not within the safe harbor of
article 2.35-1, section A(3) even if the transaction is fair. One suspects that
this example illustrates an oversight rather than an intentional limitation.
The word "solely," used liberally throughout article 2.35-1, makes clear
that this article does not attempt to validate all transactions that meet the
formal requirements of sections A(1) or A(2). Thus, if a court can set aside
a conflict-of-interest transaction because it constitutes fraud or waste, or be-
cause it fails to receive approval at a directors' meeting that meets the re-
quirements of the Texas Business Corporation Act,30 the transaction is still
vulnerable to attack on those grounds even if it meets the requirements of
sections A(l) or A(2).
The juxtaposition of section A(3) as an alternative to sections A(l) or
A(2) appears to contemplate that unfair transactions not meeting the re-
quirement of section A(3) may nevertheless be binding on the corporation if
the transactions receive approval as required by sections A(l) or A(2); the
connective "or" seems clearly to mandate that result. Yet the Delaware case
law, presumably imported wholesale by the language of article 2.35-1, flatly
rejects this construction. In Fliegler v. Lawrence31 the Delaware Supreme
Court faced a situation in which a conflict-of-interest transaction received
approval by a majority of the shares, but the great bulk of the shares voting
in favor of the transaction were owned by persons interested in the transac-
tion. The court held that despite this vote the defendants still had the bur-
den of proving the fairness of the transaction. 32 If the Texas courts accept
this position, as they should, then the prospect of obtaining approval of in-
trinsically unfair conflict-of-interest transactions by compliance with sec-
tions A(l) or (2) would apparently disappear.
What is one to make of this enigmatic and peculiar provision? At best the
provision has the legal effect of changing somewhat the rules relating to the
procedures corporations must follow to avoid creating a power of recission
of conflict-of-interest transactions. If such transactions are fair and plausi-
bly relate to the corporation's interests, that result is reasonable. The provi-
sion also provides a useful directory of minimum procedures that the
corporation should normally follow when it considers a conflict-of-interest
30. Id. art. 2.31 (Vernon 1980).
31. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
32. Id. at 222. The court stated:
Defendants argue that the transaction here in question is protected by
§ 144(a)(2) which, they contend, does not require that ratifying shareholders be
"disinterested" or "independent"; nor, they argue, is there warrant for reading
such a requirement into the statute .... We do not read the statute as providing
the broad immunity for which defendants contend. It merely removes an "inter-
ested director" cloud when its terms are met and provides against invalidation
of an agreement "solely" because such a director or officer is involved. Nothing
in the statute sanctions unfairness to Agau or removes the transaction from judi-
cial scrutiny.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted). The court nevertheless stated that the defendants had
demonstrated the intrinsic fairness of the transaction in question. Id.
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transaction: full disclosure of all material facts coupled with consideration
by the disinterested directors. Perhaps the statute intended nothing more
than this result. But I rather doubt it. The popularity of these safe harbor
provisions lies in the belief that, despite the Fliegler case, if the transaction
meets the procedural requirements of sections A(1) or A(2), then the court
will not inquire into the fairness of the transaction. That result, I believe, is
undesirable for several reasons discussed below. Certainly a literal reading
of the section would appear to contemplate this result.
The development of the conflict-of-interest provision in the 1984 Model
Business Corporation Act is instructive, since it probably reflects future de-
velopments in this area and illustrates several deficiencies in the new Texas
statute. Section 8.31 of the original Exposure Draft, published in March
1983, proposed to follow the California statute dealing with conflict-of-inter-
est transactions. 33 Under California law a court could void such transac-
tions if they were unfair. 34 The interested director had the burden of proving
that a transaction was not unfair, but if the disinterested directors or share-
holders approved the transaction (much as provided in the new Texas stat-
ute), the burden shifted to the plaintiff attacking the transaction to show that
the transaction was unfair.35 This provision basically codifies the Fliegler
holding.
The extensive written comments received on various facets of the Expo-
sure Draft criticized the approach taken in the original section 8.31, and as a
result the Committee on Corporate Laws directed that the section be re-
turned to the older form-essentially the form taken in the Delaware statute,
and now in the Texas statute as well. Even this return, however, did not
satisfy several members of the committee, who insisted that the committee
consider even further revisions in the way in which the statute treats the
conflict-of-interest transaction. The committee has discussed this new revi-
sion on several occasions and will probably recommend it for enactment af-
ter the Business Lawyer publishes it for comment, probably sometime late in
1986.
The proposed Model Act provision basically proceeds on the assumption
that the determination by disinterested directors that a conflict-of-interest
transaction is desirable should be viewed as a business judgment subject to
the protection of the business judgment rule. The proposed Model Act pro-
vision, in other words, is a true safe harbor provision, if approved by the
disinterested directors, all review of the fairness of the transaction is cut off,
though more basic defenses such as fraud, waste, or procedural failures still
remain open. As a result, the proposed sections also go to significant lengths
to define who is disinterested, covering, for example, family relationships in
some detail. I find myself in substantial disagreement with the basic assump-
tion underlying this approach. The suggestion that courts should apply the
business judgment rule to transactions or law suits involving co-directors
33. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1985).
34. Id. § 3 10(a).
35. Id. § 310(a)(3).
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assumes a degree of objectivity in directors that may exist in some individu-
als but certainly does not exist in all of them.36 Some have argued that the
theory of small group dynamics reveals that directors will have a systemic
bias in favor of other members of the board.3 7 The proposed Model Act
provision, however, applies indiscriminately to all disinterested directors, in
closely held corporations as well as publicly held ones. Further, the terms
"independent" and "disinterested" are by no means synonymous. A direc-
tor who is an employee of the corporation may be "disinterested" in a trans-
action between the CEO and the corporation since he has no financial
interest in it, but he is certainly not "independent" in any meaningful sense,
since his job may depend on a favorable vote. As a result, the proposed
provision leaves open the very real possibility that family or indirect eco-
nomic ties (not amounting to an interest in the transaction itself) may skew
the vote of nominally disinterested directors. This problem becomes consid-
erably more serious as one turns away from the publicly held corporation
and considers the closely held family corporation, in which directors are
almost never chosen because of the same independence of outlook as are
outside directors in the modern, publicly held corporation. Although the
proposed Revised Model Act provision on conflict-of-interest goes to some
length in defining precisely what is meant by "disinterested," this effort is
not likely to avoid unfair results, since in practice the drafting of bright lines
always means that the situation just across the line is not covered.
I believe that the Texas legislature should address the following problems
with the new Texas statute:
(1) The shares jointly owned or controlled by the directors who have
conflicts of interest should be expressly excluded from voting to ratify the
transaction.
(2) No decision to approve a conflict-of-interest transaction should be
made by a single director; the statute should require the approval of at least
two directors. If only a single director is eligible to act on a conflict-of-
interest transaction, then in order to receive approval the transaction must
meet the requirements of article 2.35-lA, section A(2) or (3).
(3) The statute should expressly codify the Fliegler reading of the Dela-
ware provision. This recommendation would require adoption of a provi-
sion similar to that of the California provision on conflict of interest.38
36. A similar principle also applies to determinations of the shareholders, but the 1984
Model Business Corporation Act, unlike the Delaware and Texas statutes, excludes the vote of
shares owned by persons with an interest in the transaction. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.31(d) (1984).
37. See Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1894, 1896-97 (1983). Attorneys familiar with the functioning of boards of
directors of publicly held corporations usually question whether this conclusion is true in spe-
cific cases or generally. See also Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 83,
85-108 (1985) (directors "edit" shareholders' derivative suits and evaluate suits in terms of
their own interests rather than corporations).
38. California's conflict of interest statute, codified at CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West
1977), provides:




Amendments to the Texas Professional Corporation Act during the 1985
legislative session were designed primarily to deal with the increasingly com-
mon phenomenon of interstate practice of law, and more precisely, the de-
velopment of law firms with offices in several states. The most important
amendment provides that a "professional legal corporation" 39 may be
its directors, or between a corporation and any corporation, firm or association
in which one or more of its directors has a material financial interest, is either
void or voidable because such director or directors or such other corporation,
firm or association are parties or because such director or directors are present
at the meeting of the board or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves
or ratifies the contract or transaction, if
(1) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's interest
are fully disclosed or known to the shareholders and such contract or transac-
tion is approved by the shareholders ... in good faith, with the shares owned by
the interested director of directors not being entitled to vote thereon, or
(2) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's interest
are fully disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the board or com-
mittee authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith
by a vote sufficient without counting the vote of the interested director or direc-
tors and the contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation
at the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, or
(3) As to contracts or transactions not approved as provided in paragraph (1)
or (2) of this subdivision, the person asserting the validity of the contract or
transaction sustains the burden of proving that the contract or transaction was
just and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was authorized, approved
or ratified.
A mere common directorship does not constitute a material financial interest
within the meaning of this subdivision. A director is not interested within the
meaning of this subdivision in a resolution fixing the compensation of another
director as a director, officer or employee of the corporation, notwithstanding
the fact that the first director is also receiving compensation from the
corporation.
(b) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and any corpora-
tion or association of which one or more of its directors are directors is either
void or voidable because such director or directors are present at the meeting of
the board or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies the con-
tract or transaction, if
(1) The material facts as to the transaction and as to such director's other
directorship are fully disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the
board or committee authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transaction
in good faith by a vote sufficient without counting the vote of the common direc-
tor or directors or the contract or transaction is approved by the shareholders in
good faith, or
(2) As to contracts of transactions not approved as provided in paragraph (1)
of this subdivision, the contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the
corporation at the time it is authorized, approved or ratified.
This subdivision does not apply to contracts or transactions covered by subdivi-
sion (a).
(c) Interested or common directors may be counted in determining the pres-
ence of a quorum at a meeting of the board or a committee thereof which autho-
rizes, approves or ratifies a contract or transaction.
39. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Such a corpora-
tion is defined as a corporation organized:
for the sole and specific purpose of rendering professional legal service and
which has as its shareholders only individuals who themselves are duly licensed
or otherwise authorized to render professional legal service and a majority in
number and ownership percentage of whom are residents of this state and so
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formed under the Texas Professional Corporation Act as long as (a) all of
the incorporators and the shareholders are licensed to practice law in Texas
or elsewhere, and (b) a majority of the incorporators and a majority of the
shareholders who hold a majority interest in the corporation are residents of
Texas and are authorized to practice law in Texas. 4° In effect, this amend-
ment permits attorneys licensed in other states to be a minority of the share-
holders of a Texas professional corporation. The legislature also made a
minor amendment to section 1541 to make clear that professional services by
a Texas professional corporation outside of Texas need not be rendered by
an attorney licensed in Texas.42
The legislature also added a new section to the Texas Professional Corpo-
ration Act authorizing a foreign professional corporation engaged in the
practice of law to qualify to render professional legal services in Texas if a
majority of its shareholders (both in number and in interest) are residents of
Texas and authorized to practice law in this state.43 This section expressly
requires that professional legal services rendered in Texas by a qualified for-
eign professional corporation be performed by a person licensed or otherwise
authorized to render professional services in Texas. Furthermore, for a for-
eign legal professional corporation to qualify to transact business in Texas,
the state of incorporation of that corporation must grant reciprocal admis-
sion to the same corporation if it were incorporated in Texas.44
Another statute enacted in 1985 deals with the situation in which the sole
shareholder of a professional corporation dies or otherwise becomes legally
disqualified to render professional services contemplated by the corporation.
In the past only a qualified professional could perform the winding up of a
professional corporation's affairs; no provision authorized a nonqualified
person entitled to the corporation's assets (e.g., an heir) to wind up the cor-
poration's affairs upon the death or disqualification of the sole shareholder.
The legislature amended section 14 of the Texas Professional Corporation
Act 45 to permit the legally disqualified shareholder, or the person succeeding
to the interest of the shareholder, to serve as officer, director, and share-
holder of the corporation solely to wind up the corporation's affairs and ef-
fect its dissolution.
duly licensed or otherwise duly authorized to render professional legal service
within this state.
Id. "Professional legal service" is defined as services of an attorney-at-law that, within the
State of Texas, require the obtaining of a "license, permit, certificate of registration, or other
legal authorization" and which could not be performed by a corporation (prior to the enact-
ment of the Texas Professional Corporation Act). Id. § 3(c).
40. Id. art. 1528e, §§ 4, 12.
41. Id. § 15.
42. On the other hand, the amendment to § 15 discussed in the text appears clearly to
require that all professional services rendered by a Texas professional corporation inside of
Texas be rendered by an attorney licensed in Texas and may not be rendered by an attorney
who is a shareholder of the corporation licensed only in another state. Id. § 15.
43. Id. art. 1528e, § 19A.
44. Id. § 19A(b).
45. Id. § 14.
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D. Registration of Names of Banking and Related Corporations
The legislature amended article 2.07 of the Texas Business Corporation
Act 46 in 1985 to permit a bank, trust company, building and loan association
or company, and an insurance company with a valid certificate of authority
to transact business in Texas to register their names with the secretary of
state under that article for whatever benefit that provides. Article 2.07 was
originally derived from the 1950 Model Business Corporation Act.47 That
section was intended to permit foreign corporations not qualified to transact
business in Texas to register their corporate name to assure that that name
would be available if the corporation thereafter elected to qualify to transact
business in this state. The official comment to sections 9 and 10 of the 1950
Model Business Corporation Act states only that the sections are designed to
provide a convenient method for a foreign corporation to reserve its name
for a longer time than is permitted by section 8 of the Model Act,4 8 and are
"intended" as a convenience for a corporation which plans to extend its area
of operations. 49 In practice section 9 also assured the foreign corporation
that no domestic corporation could elect to use the same or a deceptively
similar name in a filing with the secretary of state.
Many persons erroneously believe that the registration of a name under
article 2.07 gives the registrant some right or entitlement to the use of that
name as against the world in general. The only direct advantage of registra-
tion, however, is that the name is entered in the list of unavailable names
maintained by the office of the secretary of states. That office will not permit
another corporation to use the same or a deceptively similar name in a filing
with that office. Apparently nothing prevents a corporation named ABC
Corporation, for example, from doing business under an assumed name,
DEF Corporation, that is identical with the name of another corporation on
the list of unavailable names maintained by the office of the secretary of
state.5° Whether the original DEF Corporation can prevent ABC Corpora-
tion from doing business under the name DEF Corporation is a matter of the
law of unfair competition. The position of the secretary of state as to
whether the names are the same or deceptively similar will presumably carry
little weight with a court in view of the limited scope of investigation under-
taken by the secretary of state's office. The secretary of state's office does not
consider the nature or the scope of the two businesses in question, or the
geographical area or areas in which each operates. That office simply com-
pares the names for linguistic identity or similarity, using a set of guidelines
46. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.07 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
47. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 9 (1950).
48. Section 8 relates to the reservation of a corporate name by a person planning to form a
corporation. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.06 (Vernon 1980).
49. Id. § 8.
50. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.05, § B (Vernon 1980) (authorizing domestic
or qualified foreign corporations to utilize an assumed name upon filing an assumed name
certificate).
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that that office has formally promulgated. 5'1 The secretary of state's standard
does not seek to determine unfair competition, but rather whether the names
are likely to create confusion from the perspective of the secretary of state or
by someone using the records of the secretary of state's office. 52 No Texas
court has rendered a definitive decision on this issue, however, and possibly a
court may give the secretary of state's determination more weight in an un-
fair competition case than it would appear to merit.
In Texas, banks, trust companies, building and loan companies, and insur-
ance companies incorporate under special statutes rather than under the
Texas Business Corporation Act. 53 Since a corporate name cannot contain
words or phrases that indicate any purpose other than one or more of the
purposes for which the organization was formed, 54 the original assumption
was that there was little chance that a corporation organized under the
Texas Business Corporations Act could use a name that might be similar to
that of one of these financial corporations. With the onset of deregulation,
the development of bank holding companies, and the like, the line (and
therefore also the names) between corporations formed under the Texas
Business Corporations Act and under banking and similar statutes has prob-
ably become less clear. Presumably for this reason bankers in Texas success-
fully obtained the enactment of this legislation. As indicated above, bankers
probably have not gotten very much for their efforts. Certainly if controver-
sies arise over entitlement to name use, the basic remedy should be litigation
under such principles as unfair competition and violation of trade mark
rather than litigation to compel the secretary of state to refuse a filing.
E. Miscellaneous Provisions
In 1985 the Texas legislature adopted a variety of minor changes to vari-
ous provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act designed to improve
the efficiency or fairness of certain substantive provisions of that Act. Even
though these provisions are minor in a global sense, they will, of course, be
of critical importance to attorneys faced with problems in the specific areas.
In addition, the legislature made several changes in filing procedures
designed both to simplify those procedures and to minimize the unnecessary
workload in the corporation section of the secretary of state's office.
1. Required officers. Prior to the 1985 amendments article 2.42, section A
of the Texas Business Corporation Act required every corporation to have
four officers: a president, one or more vice presidents, a secretary, and a
51. Tex. Office of See. of State, 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 79.31-.54 (Shepard's Aug. 29,
1987) (corporate name availability).
52. The 1984 Model Business Corporation Act recognized the limited scope of review of
corporate names by filing authorities when it changed the standard of review for name availa-
bility to consideration of whether the name "is distinguishable upon the records of the secre-
tary of state," MODEL BuSINESS CORP. ACT § 4.01 (1984).
53. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.01, § B(4) (Vernon 1980).
54. Id. art. 2.05, § A(2).
19861
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
treasurer, though the same person could hold any two or more offices. 55 The
1985 amendments reduce the number of required officers to two: a president
and a secretary. 56 In contrast, the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act 57 and the Delaware General Corporation Law58 do not require any spe-
cifically designated officers, although the Model Act does recognize that one
officer must perform functions normally associated with the office of secre-
tary. 59 The theory of these provisions is that corporations should be free to
designate the offices they desire. Further, the statutory offices carry with
them implications of authority that a corporation may wish to negate, or to
give to other designated offices. The Texas Bar Association committee gave
consideration to this solution, but technical language in other statutes made
it appear desirable to retain at least the two statutory offices.
2. Filling of Vacancies on the Board of Directors. In closely held corpora-
tions a very common way of assuring minority shareholder participation on
the board of directors is to create different classes of common shares, usually
with identical financial rights, each entitled to elect a designated number of
directors. The creation of classes of common shares to elect directors often
reflects a degree of mistrust among the participants in the corporation;
otherwise a guarantee that a shareholder could obtain designated representa-
tion on the board might not be necessary. Until the 1985 amendments the
Texas Business Corporation Act did not adequately handle the problem that
arose upon the death or resignation of a director elected by a special class of
common shares. Article 2.34 essentially permitted the remainder of the
board of directors to fill such a vacancy, even though that method of filling
the vacancy did not guarantee the shareholder the designated representation
he originally bargained for and, indeed, in cases of actual antagonism, might
frustrate completely the original plan.6° The 1985 amendments correct this
problem by requiring a vacancy in the board of directors selected by a spe-
cific class of shares to be filled only by the shareholders of that class or by
other directors elected by that class. 6 1 The amendments extend the same
principle to filling newly created directorships. 62
3. Internal Affairs Rule for Foreign Corporations. The conflict of laws rule
for foreign corporations states generally that the law of the state of incorpo-
ration governs issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation.
Although most states generally accept the rule, statutory provisions in Cali-
fornia 63 and New York64 purport to apply specific portions of the state's
55. Id. art. 2.42, § A (Vernon 1980) (amended 1985).
56. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.42, § A (Vernon Supp. 1986).
57. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.40 (1984).
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (1983).
59. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 1.40(20), 8.40(c) (1984).
60. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.34 (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983).
61. Id. § D (Vernon Supp. 1986).
62. Cf MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.10(b) (1984) (only holders of shares of stock
that elected director can fill that vacancy).
63. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977) (amended 1978).
64. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1319 (Consol. 1963) (amended 1969).
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corporation law to foreign corporations with significant contacts in that
state. The constitutionality of these provisions remains unclear.65 In 1985
the Texas legislature adopted minor amendments to the Texas Business Cor-
poration Act to clarify that Texas did not intend to impose its law upon the
internal affairs of foreign corporations qualified to transact business in
Texas. Of some interest is the language added to article 8.02 that the inter-
nal affairs of a foreign corporation include, but are not limited to, "the
rights, powers, and duties of its board of directors and shareholders and
matters relating to its shares." '66
4. Amendments of the Indemnification Provisions. In 1983 Texas adopted a
modern indemnification statute67 modeled upon provisions adopted by the
Committee on Corporate laws for the Model Business Corporation Act.68
Following the enactment of this complex statute, a few problems cropped up
that justified several clean-up amendments:
(a) The language of article 2.02-1, section M, that indemnification provi-
sions not consistent with the statute were void raised the possibility that
prestatutory provisions might be unenforceable if they exceeded the permis-
sible scope of statutory indemnification under article 2.02-1 in any minor (or
major) respect. In 1985 the language of section M was changed to provide
that provisions are "valid only to the extent" a provision is consistent with
the statutory standards.69
(b) The legislature amended the language of article 2.02-1, sections H
and M, to make clear that all rights granted by the statute apply to persons
previously named as defendants in a proceeding, those threatened with being
named as defendants, and those currently named as defendants. 70
(c) The legislature amended the language of article 2.02-1, section G, to
make clear that the requirement that a corporation authorize indemnifica-
tion 7' applied only to voluntary decisions to indemnify directors, and not to
situations in which indemnification is mandatory by statute or by prior
65. See Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Res., Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852,
854 (1983).
66. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
67. Id. art. 2.02-1, § M. This statute is also analyzed at some length in Hamilton, Corpo-
rations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 235, 255 (1984).
68. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act
Affecting Indemnification of Corporate Personnel, 36 Bus. LAW. 99 (1980). The 1984 Model
Business Corporation Act simplifies and restates these complex provisions although the 1984
version makes no substantive changes. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 8.50-.58 (3d
ed. 1984).
69. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art 2.02-1, § M (Vernon Supp. 1986). The new language
is consistent with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.58(a) (3d ed, 1984).
70. Id. These amendments are technical in nature and are consistent with the language of
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.50(2), (6) (1984).
71. A "determination" that indemnification is permissible is distinguished from an "au-
thorization" to indemnify in § G. The same distinction is made in the MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.55 (3d ed. 1984). In somewhat simplified terms, a determination relates
only to eligibility; an authorization is a corporate determination that the payment of indemnifi-
cation is a desirable and appropriate use of corporate resources.
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agreement by which the corporation undertakes to indemnify all persons to
the maximum extent permitted by statute.
5. Simplification of Filing Requirements. The legislature effected two ma-
jor simplifications in the formal requirements for documents filed with the
secretary of state. First, the legislature eliminated the requirement that a
corporation verify the document. 72 Second, the legislature eliminated the
requirement that certain specified officers execute a document intended for
filing and replaced it with a simple provision requiring execution by one (un-
specified) corporate officer.73 The former requirement had been that the
president or vice president and secretary or assistant secretary execute the
document. 74
The elimination of the verification requirement opens up at least the possi-
bility that a corporation might intentionally file false or fraudulent docu-
ments with the secretary of state. To impose a penalty on such conduct, the
1985 amendments added article 10.02 to the Texas Business Corporation
Act,7 5 making the knowing execution of a false document with intent to file
it with the secretary of state a class A misdemeanor.
76
6. Amendments to Nonprofit Corporation Act. Amendments made to the
Texas Nonprofit Corporation Act added an indemnification provision analo-
gous to that now appearing in the Texas Business Corporation Act 77 and a
provision to permit telephonic meetings of directors analogous to those per-
mitted by corporations-for-profit.7 8
7. Recodification of Civil Procedure Statutes. In a nonsubstantive revision
the Texas legislature recodified statutes relating to service of process and
venue in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.79 The new section numbers
(with the repealed articles of the old civil statutes in parenthesis) are as fol-
lows: (1) Sections 17.021 and 17.022 of the new Civil Practice Code now
govern service on a partnership (old articles 2033, 2033b, 2033c, and 2223
72. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.13, § E, art. 4.04, § A, art. 4.07, § D, art.
4.10, § B, art. 4.11, § B, art. 4.12, § B, art. 5.04, § A, art. 6.06, § A, art. 8.05, § B, art. 8.09,
§ B (Vernon Supp. 1986). Apparently through oversight, the verification requirements for
articles of incorporation and for articles of short form merger between parent and subsidiary
were not eliminated. See id. arts. 3.02, 5.16 (Vernon 1980). Presumably, the next set of
amendments prepared by the Texas Bar Association will eliminate the verification require-
ments for these documents as well.
73. See, e.g., id. art. 2.10, § B, art. 2.13, § E, art. 4.04, § A, art. 4.07, § D, art. 4.10, § B,
art. 4.11, § B, art. 4.12, § B, art. 5.04, § A, art. 6.06, § A, art. 8.05, § B, art. 8.14, § B (Vernon
Supp. 1986). Apparently through oversight, articles of short form merger between parent and
subsidiary were not listed. See id. art. 5.16, § B (Vernon 1980).
74. Apparently through oversight, article 10.01 was not changed to reflect the 1985
amendments. See id. art. 10.01 (Vernon 1980).
75. Id. art. 10.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
76. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Vernon 1974) makes such an offense punishable by
a fine not to exceed $2,000 or confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year.
77. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-2.22A (Vernon Supp. 1986).
78. Id. art. 1396-9.11.
79. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7043, 7053-62, 7079-90
(Vernon).
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are repealed);80 (2) Section 17.023 of the new Civil Practice Code now gov-
erns service on a corporation or joint stock association amenable to process
in the state (old article 2029 is repealed);81 (3) Sections 17.041-17.045 of the
new Civil Practice Code now codify the Texas long-arm statute (old article
2031b is repealed);8 2 (4) Section 15.036 of the new Civil Code codified per-
missible venue of a suit against a domestic corporation or association, in-
cluding a partnership (old article 1995, § 3(f) is repealed);8 3 and (5) Section
15.037 of the new Civil Code codified permissive venue of a suit against a
foreign corporation (old article 1995, § 3(g) is repealed).8 4 Although the
caption of the Act states that this recodification is nonsubstantive, subse-
quent litigation may reveal possible inadvertant changes in substance.
II. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
A. Partnerships
1. General Analysis. The Texas courts decided more than fifteen cases
dealing with partnership and joint venture issues during the Survey period.
Reading all these cases at a single sitting is a rather dismal experience; it
reveals that partnership law is not the strongest suit of either the Texas judi-
ciary or the Texas bar. Although an annual survey such as this should con-
centrate primarily on what the courts did rather than on what they should
have done, a few preliminary comments may be helpful in setting forth my
own perspective for the benefit of attorneys faced with partnership issues in
the future.
The Texas partnership cases during the Survey period revealed two basic
jurisprudential problems. First, both the bench and the bar have demon-
strated a continuing reluctance to recognize that the law of partnership to-
day is largely codified by uniform statutes.85 Obviously, when a statute is
directly applicable to a case, the statute should control the decision and reli-
ance on holding or dicta in cases predating the statute that may or may not
say the same thing as the statute is unnecessary.8 6 But that is not the Texas
way in partnership cases. In most of the partnership cases decided during
the Survey period the court preferred to rely on language in pre-statute opin-
80. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.021, .022 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
81. Id. § 17.23.
82. Id. §§ 17.041-.45.
83. Id. § 15.036.
84. Id. § 15.037.
85. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970) codifies the Texas Uniform
Partnership Act. The Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act, codified at id. art. 6132a, was
originally patterned after the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1913), but in response to
judicial decisions and uncertainties in that early statute the legislature has substantially
amended the statute. These amendments, however, follow to some extent provisions of the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act or provisions in other state limited partnership
statutes.
86. Even though the Texas Uniform Partnership Act is largely consistent with the pre-
1961 Texas common law of partnership, the language in the pre-1961 Texas cases about part-




ions. Directly applicable statutory language that should have been control-
ling was cited as supplementary authority in about half of the cases. In the
remaining cases Texas courts resolved partnership issues entirely on the ba-
sis of case law without any reference or citation to the applicable statutory
provision. 87 This undesirable state of affairs is presumably the result of the
failure of Texas lawyers to cite the controlling statutory provision for the
benefit of the court rather than a judge's refusal to apply squarely applicable
statutory provisions.
Second, confusion continues as to what legal rules apply to joint ventures
as contrasted with partnerships. 88 In a way this confusion is more difficult
to understand than the role of statute and case law, since no general body of
joint venture law exists. Furthermore, a joint venture is a species of partner-
ship, a narrow purpose partnership that is subject to the same principles as
partnerships except to the extent the narrower purpose provides a justifica-
tion for a different rule. 89 A narrow or broad purpose is obviously a matter
87. The Fifth Circuit does not follow the Texas courts in this rejection of relevant statu-
tory law. See Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1174 (5th Cir. 1985), in
which the court addressed whether the estate of a deceased partner may sue derivatively or in
its own right on a partnership claim entirely on the basis of the Texas Uniform Partnership
Act. This case is discussed infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
88. Texas case law defines a joint venture as being based on an express or implied agree-
ment containing four essential elements: (1) a community of interest in the venture, (2) an
agreement to share profits, (3) an agreement to share losses, and (4) a mutual right of control
or management of the enterprise. United States v. $47,875 in United States Currency, 746
F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 572 S.W.2d
285, 287 (Tex. 1978)). Micrea is the leading case in a line of Texas precedent in which parties
agreeing to share profits in a joint enterprise were held not liable for the debts of the venture
since the parties had no agreement to share losses and therefore no joint venture or partnership
existed. See also Tex-Co Grain Co. v. Happy Wheat Growers, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ) (sharing of losses is a necessary element in a joint ven-
ture); Gutierrez v. Yancey, 650 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ)
(absence of express provision to share losses indicates no partnership was intended). In the
Fifth Circuit case, the court concluded that no joint venture existed because one of the partici-
pants had no assets and therefore did not contemplate the sharing of losses. 746 F.2d at 294.
With respect, this entire line of precedent is based on unsound principles. A sharing of profits
should imply a sharing of losses in the absence of additional factors: persons often are optimis-
tic and discuss expressly the sharing of profits but do not consider the possibility of a sharing
of losses. That does not mean that the parties did not create a partnership or joint venture.
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(l)(a) (Vernon 1970). Also, if a participant
has the ownership and control contemplated for the partnership or joint venture relationship,
he should be liable for the venture's debts to third parties without regard to any secret internal
agreement among the participants as to how they will share losses. A private agreement be-
tween A and B, for example, to operate a business with the profits to be split evenly, but A to
bear all losses, should nevertheless be viewed as the creation of a partnership or joint venture
so that third persons may sue B as well as A. If the third person compels B to pay some
liability, B has a claim against A under the agreement (since A agreed that he would assume all
the losses), but to argue that B is not a partner or joint venturer at all because of the secret
agreement between A and B that B would not bear any losses is unrealistic and unsound. In
effect, the rights of creditors would be subject to a secret agreement of which the creditors were
not aware, in contradiction to the appearance that A and B are jointly engaged in a partnership
or joint venture.
89. For example, the common law rule stated that it was ultra vires for a corporation to
enter into a general partnership because the agency principles in a partnership were thought to
be inconsistent with the powers of the board of directors in a corporation. It was not ultra
vires, however, for a corporation to enter into a joint venture, on the theory that the narrower
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of degree and not of kind, and language recognizing this point is scattered
throughout the Texas partnership cases decided during the Survey period.90
Indeed, the absence of a sharp dividing line between a partnership and a
joint venture makes it impractical to maintain different legal rules for the
two classes. In the words of one of the modern treatises on agency and
partnership:
The joint venture, known variously as joint adventure or joint enter-
prise, is difficult to adequately describe, differing from a general part-
nership perhaps more by definition than in fact. It is nevertheless best
identified as a special form of partnership in which some limiting factor
prevents a complete development of the partnership relation. This lim-
iting factor may take a multitude of forms, ranging from statutory con-
siderations prohibiting operation of certain businesses by partnership to
the creation of a business entity which contemplates something less
than the mutual agency relation between associates necessary for the
existence of a general partnership. Thus, the joint venture, if distin-
guished from a partnership at all, must be categorized as a business
association similar to the partnership but more narrow in purpose and
scope.9 1
Practically none of the Texas cases decided during the Survey period recog-
nizes expressly this close affinity if not complete identicality of legal princi-
ples. Some courts appear to accept the notion that joint ventures and
partnerships are discretely different animals to be governed presumptively by
different rules.92
If Texas courts wish to pursue seriously this dual approach, then it be-
comes important to define the shadowy line between narrow and broad pur-
poses in order to distinguish between these two types of organizations. The
Texas cases, however, do not appear to attempt to do this. Rather the classi-
fication of a particular business appears to depend primarily on what name
the parties use. If the parties call a venture a "partnership," then the courts
will probably apply the common law rules of partnership law, but the same
venture, if called a "joint venture" in the agreement, will probably be judged
by whatever partially articulated set of rules the court believes to constitute
joint venture law.93 Other Texas cases exhibit total confusion or indifference
purpose of that venture limited the power of the remaining venturers to bind the corporation in
a manner inconsistent with the powers of the boards of directors.
90. For example, one Texas case decided during the Survey period refers to a "partnership
formed to carry out a single transaction or venture." Davis v. Johnson, 689 S.W.2d 297, 300
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.) (emphasis added).
91. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 266 (1979).
92. See, e.g., Milberg Factors v. Hurwitz-Nordlicht, 676 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (joint venture and a partnership are not synonymous; many joint
ventures are not partnerships even though there may be a sharing of profits; whether a joint
venture or partnership exists depends upon parties' intent).
93. Compare Ked-Wick Corp. v. Levinton, 681 S.W.2d 851, 858 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (court treated as a joint venture an apparently continuing arrange-
ment to build and market new homes) with Washburn v. Krenek, 684 S.W.2d 187, 191 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court treated as a partnership an appar-
ently continuing arrangement to subdivide and sell residential lots). The most logical explana-
tion of cases such as these is that in Ked- Wick the parties described the arrangement as a joint
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in this area. Some courts announce the issue in terms of "joint venture law"
but then slide imperceptibly into the use of the word partnership and back
again in the same opinion. 94
Which of these two jurisprudential problems contribute the most to the
current malaise of Texas partnership law is unclear, but in tandem they cre-
ate chaos in an area of law that should be relatively stable and well under-
stood. The strong tendency to treat the law of partnership as common law
rather than statutory law makes it relatively easier for the courts also to view
the law of joint venture as common law. Both of them are creatures of com-
mon law development that may be different in shadow or nuance but similar
in some uncertain respects, which the court may flesh out in the best com-
mon law tradition of case-by-case analysis. As a result, confusion reigns
supreme and uncontradicted in the Texas law of partnership.
A good example during the Survey period of the logical chaos that now
exists in Texas partnership joint venture law is Milberg Factors v. Hurwitz-
Nordlicht.95 The issue that the court addressed was whether a joint ven-
turer's creditors may attach the assets of the joint venture as if the venture
were merely an aggregate of its venturers. 96 The alternative was to treat the
venture as a distinct legal entity, such as a corporation or partnership, in
which case the creditors of an individual member could not reach the assets
of that entity. If Texas partnership law had not been marked by the long
struggle about whether it consists of statutory or common law and whether
joint ventures are a species of partnership, this question should hardly have
justified an appeal. The correct answer is that section 28 of the Texas Uni-
form Partnership Act mandates that an individual creditor may not seize
partnership property; he may proceed only through a charging order.97 An
individual creditor of a partner cannot attach partnership property directly
because a contrary conclusion would result in interference with the interests
of the other partners. This rationale is totally independent of the scope or
breadth of the venture and therefore applies equally to a joint venture-but
not in Texas. Because of the total confusion regarding the legal rules appli-
cable to joint ventures in Texas, the creditors argued plausibly and strenu-
ously that since the relationship was a joint venture and not a partnership,
the relationship did not involve a separate legal entity. The property inter-
ests of joint venturers were therefore akin to the property interests of joint
tenants or tenants in common . 9
venture but in Washburn the parties described it as a partnership. Both of these cases are
discussed in more detail infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
94. For example, a case involving two joint ventures to build two apartment buildings
refers consistently to the appointment of a receiver to take control of partnership assets. Smith
v. Smith, 681 S.W.2d 793, 794-96 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The ex-
planation for this lack of distinction, may, of course, be that the court was aware that the two
categories had no operative difference and therefore regarded the two terms as synonymous.
95. 676 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
96. Id. at 615.
97. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 28 (Vernon 1979).
98. It is interesting to note in passing, with a touch of dejd vu, that this same argument
made in connection with partnerships in the nineteenth century led to the development of the
English Partnership Act of 1890 and ultimately to the Uniform Partnership Act of 1913.
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Fortunately, the court rejected this argument in Hurwitz-Nordlicht.99 The
court based its opinion, however, on a syllogism of inconsistent and irrele-
vant principles that can only lead to the creation of further problems and
uncertainties. The following statements, taken from the court's opinion in
the sequence in which they appear, represent perhaps the strongest evidence
that the judiciary's view of Texas partnership law needs drastic repair: (1) A
joint venture and a partnership are not synonymous; (2) many joint ventures
are not partnerships even though there may be a sharing of profits; (3) the
relationship of partners and joint venturers is contractual in nature;
(4) whether a joint venture or a partnership exists depends in part upon the
intention of the parties; (5) a joint venture is a legal entity; (6) the four ele-
ments of a joint venture are a community of interest, an agreement to share
profits, an agreement to share losses, and a mutual right of control; (7) the
requirement of mutual control will not preclude a joint venturer from dele-
gating the duties of management to another joint venturer; (8) here the joint
venture agreement provides that it is to be governed by partnership rules;
(9) here the debtor had no right to convey the joint venture's property with-
out the consent of his co-venturers; and therefore, (10) "A writ of attach-
ment cannot be had against property of the joint venture since it is not
property of the debtor that is subject to execution and not property which
the debtor can pass title by his sole act.'1 °
In the balance of this discussion I turn to the partnership problems ad-
dressed by the Texas courts during the Survey period and consider how the
courts should resolve them under the Texas Uniform Partnership Act. Gen-
erally, the discussion draws no distinction between cases involving joint ven-
tures and partnerships, though when the court categorizes a relationship as
one or the other, I follow that categorization.
2. Formation of a Partnership. Negrini v. Plus Two Advertising, Inc. 101 in-
volved whether a partnership was created preparatory to the formation of a
corporation.' 0 2 The parties testified that they always intended to incorpo-
rate and that the Negrinis never intended to be personally responsible for the
business's obligations. When the Negrinis filed an assumed name certificate,
however, the partnership block was checked. Al Negrini testified that since
the assumed name certificate did not have a box for corporations, he checked
general partnership as the next closest organizational form. The court relied
on section 6(1) of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act 0 3 and concluded that
under all the circumstances, no evidence existed that the Negrinis intended
to associate themselves as co-owners in the venture except as sharehold-
ers. 1 04 Therefore, the court held that the Negrinis were not personally liable
99. 676 S.W.2d at 616.
100. Id. at 615-16.
101. 695 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
102. A second major issue in the case, whether the parties formed the corporation without
changing the firm name under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.02 (Vernon 1970), is
discussed infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
103. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6(1) (Vernon 1970).
104. 695 S.W.2d at 631.
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on the plaintiffs claim for advertising commissions.105
3. Statute of Frauds Applicable to Partnership Agreements. Gano v.
Jamail10 6 involved a dispute between a well-known Houston attorney and
his former partner. The firm of Jamail and Gano existed from 1969 through
1978 under an oral agreement that Gano claimed provided for an equal divi-
sion of profits. After the parties terminated their relationship, Gano brought
suit to enforce the terms of this alleged oral agreement, but his partner ar-
gued that the oral agreement was not enforceable under the Texas statute of
frauds 10 7 since the parties could not perform the agreement within one year.
The court basically accepted this argument since the firm's cases generally
lasted more than one year and Gano owned a one-half interest in them. 108
From Gano's testimony it became apparent that the oral agreement was to
continue until the cases were resolved. The court also held, as an alternative
ground, that Gano might be estopped from claiming additional compensa-
tion since, during the years of the partnership, he accepted without objection
distributions from Jamail that were significantly less than the one-half inter-
est he was claiming in the litigation.109
4. Title to Real Property Owned by a Partnership. In Nolana Development
Association v. Corsi' 10 a joint venture owned a large tract of land. The part-
ners sold an interest in this partnership to Manny Corsi. The partnership
refinanced the mortgage on the property in connection with the sale and
placed title in the name of Ann Corsi, Manny's wife, as trustee to facilitate
the refinancing. The name of the joint venture, Nolana Development Asso-
ciation, did not appear on either the note or the accompanying mortgage;
title to the real property was simply in the name of Ann Corsi as trustee.
The Texas Supreme Court appended the following footnote to the statement
of facts in its opinion: "We offer no explanation why the parties conducted
their business in this manner. We simply present these curious facts, gleaned
from a very limited record.""' The court apparently was unaware that the
Texas Uniform Partnership Act expressly contemplated this method of re-
cording title to partnership property." 2 The Act recognizes the following
forms in which title to partnership property may be recorded: (1) in the
partnership name; (2) in the name of one or more but not all partners with-
out reference to the partnership; (3) in a third person as trustee for the part-
nership; and (4) in the names of all the partners. 1 3 Both the supreme court
and the court of appeals' 14 devoted a large portion of their opinions to the
105. Id. at 632.
106. 678 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
107. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
108. 678 S.W.2d at 154.
109. Id.
110. 682 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1984).
111. Id. at 248 n.1.
112. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 10 (Vernon 1970).
113. Id.
114. 674 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), rev'd, 682 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1984).
[Vol. 40
CORPORATIONS AND PAR TNERSHIPS
entirely extraneous question of whether placing title to the property in the
name of Ann Corsi as trustee created an express trust subject to the Texas
Trust Act, a passive or "dry" trust, or no trust at all. The courts were ap-
parently unfamiliar with the widespread use of nominees to hold title and
did not recognize that the form used was a matter of convenience to enable
simple conveyance or reconveyance of partnership real estate, as witnessed
by the immediate execution of a new mortgage in this case. The court
should have recognized that Ann Corsi was simply a holder of naked title
and had no obligations to the partnership other than to reconvey the prop-
erty upon demand. Contemporaneously with placing the title to the real
estate in the name of Ann Corsi, however, Manny and Ann Corsi had writ-
ten a letter to the other partners in which they stated that they were respon-
sible for one-third of the debt. The signature of Ann Corsi did not contain
the words "as trustee," and the court concluded that the transaction created
a personal obligation on her part to compensate the other co-venturers for
the Corsi's share of the loss ultimately incurred on the debt.1 15 In view of
her relationship with Manny Corsi, this conclusion probably was reasonable.
In another case decided during the Survey period1 16 a joint venture took
title to real estate in a similar form: "Sam Wright, Trustee." Sam Wright
was also a participant in the venture. The court had no trouble treating this
as merely a manner of holding title to real estate by a joint venture without
any special significance. The issue was whether the other joint venturers
were liable on a promissory note signed by "Sam Wright, Trustee." The
court should have resolved this issue by questioning whether the note was
within the actual or apparent authority of a partner, an issue addressed in
general terms in section 9 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act. 1 7 The
court did not refer to this provision, but concluded that the other venturers
were liable because the agreement contemplated the execution of the note.
The dissent argued that the court should view the designation "Sam Wright,
Trustee," as identical in legal effect to "Sam Wright, Individually." Further,
the dissent said that the court should not view Wright as an agent for the
remaining joint venturers since he purchased the property and gave the note
several months before the joint venture agreement was signed.'" 8 The dis-
sent fails to give any recognition to the natural agency powers created by
partnership or joint venture relationships.
5. Liability for Acts of Co-partners. In Ked- Wick Corp. v. Levinton" 9 the
115. 682 S.W.2d at 250.
116. Eggers v. Hinckley, 683 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App-Dallas 1984, no writ).
117. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9(1) (Vernon 1970) states:
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and
the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any
instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the part-
nership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so
acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter,
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no
such authority.
118. 683 S.W.2d at 479.
119. 681 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
court rejected an argument that one co-adventurer was not liable for the
negligence of a second co-adventures in the absence of a showing of control
over the actions of that second co-adventurer. The scope of a partner's lia-
bility for the acts of his co-partners is set forth in section 9 of the Texas
Uniform Partnership Act.' 20 The court did not cite the applicable provi-
sions of the Uniform Partnership Act, but relied on two Texas cases, one
decided in 1941121 and the other in 1956,122 for the rule that in a joint ven-
ture each party is legally responsible for the act of the other performed
within the scope of the enterprise.' 23 The court therefore reached the cor-
rect result. Interestingly, a very similar issue arose in the same court ap-
proximately one month later before a different panel of judges. 124 The later
case contained similar facts with two exceptions. First, the parties described
the relationship as a partnership rather than a joint venture and second, the
breach involved a failure to comply with covenants relating to other land
owned by the partners rather than a breach of warranty dealing with materi-
als and workmanship. The court again reached the correct result but failed
to cite Ked- Wick, the two earlier cases relied on in that case, or the relevant
provisions of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act. Rather, the court cited
yet a third pre-TUPA case for the same proposition, this time dealing with a
partnership rather than a joint venture. 125
In another case' 26 involving a somewhat similar issue, the court held that
a promissory note signed only by a partner in his individual name, without
indicating that the note represented a partnership obligation, did not bind
the partnership or the remaining partners. 127 Of course, a partner could
quite possibly sign a partnership obligation only in his own name; while
somewhat irregular, there should be no objection to viewing the note as a
partnership obligation if both parties so understand and the partnership uses
the proceeds of the loan for partnership purposes. Since the creditor here
obtained separate notes from each partner in an individual capacity for por-
tions of the debt, and the interest rates on the various notes differed, the
court's conclusion that the parties intended only an individual obligation is
reasonable. 128
BancTexas Allen Parkway v. Allied American Bank 129 involved a dispute
between two banks as to priorities of two liens on partnership assets. The
issue essentially was whether a note executed by one partner in the partner-
120. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9(1) (Vernon 1970).
121. Martin v. Weaver, 161 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1941, writ ref'd
w.o.m.).
122. Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 292 S.W.2d 803, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1956), modified on other grounds, 305 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1957).
123. 681 S.W.2d at 858.
124. Washburn v. Krenek, 684 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
125. Id. at 191 (citing Brewer v. Big Lake State Bank, 378 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1964, no writ)).
126. Anderson v. Badger, 693 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
127. Id. at 648.
128. Id.
129. 694 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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ship name to cover a bank overdraft bound the partnership. 130 One would
expect that such a note would have at least been within the partner's appar-
ent authority under section 9 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, but the
court did not cite the statute. Instead the court applied the following test for
ratification of an unauthorized transaction: whether the remaining partner
knew that the new loan was taken in the partnership name and did not ob-
ject to its creation. 31 The court found no evidence to show that the other
partner even knew of the new loan; therefore, it was not a partnership
obligation. 13 2
6. Liability of Departing Partner for Subsequent Partnership Debts. In
Thomas v. American National Bank 133 a party in a joint venture entered into
an informal agreement with the managing partner 34 that the managing
partner would acquire the party's interest in the venture in exchange for a
discharge of the party's share of the venture's indebtedness. After this trans-
action, the managing partner incurred additional indebtedness in the name
of the venture, and the plaintiff brought suit to hold the withdrawing joint
venturer liable on this debt. The legal principles applicable to this type of
situation are quite clear. Under section 35(1) of the Texas Uniform Partner-
ship Act a withdrawing partner remains liable on subsequently incurred in-
debtedness to a creditor who extends credit in ignorance of the withdrawal
unless the withdrawing partner publishes the notice required by section
35(l)(b). 135 The court here reached the correct result but did not refer to
section 35(l)(b) (though it did refer to section 9(1), dealing with the scope of
the agency existing among partners). 36 The court's discussion creates the
appearance that it did not understand the difference between dissolution of a
partnership as between the partners, which may occur without more by the
the express will of any partner at any time, 137 and elimination of the contin-
uing apparent authority that each partner possesses to bind the partnership
and the remaining partners to post-dissolution obligations.
7 Transactions Antedating the Filing of a Limited Partnership Certificate.
Lawyers forming limited partnerships generally create the limited partner-
ship and file the certificate or limited partnership agreement, as the case may
be, before the partners take any steps to enter into business. Shindler v.
130. If the note bound the partnership, then BancTexas would have priority under a prior
deed of trust containing a standard future advances clause that would cover the note in
question.
131. 694 S.W.2d at 181.
132. Id. A final case involving the same principle is MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 695 S.W.2d 208
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ granted), in which the court correctly stated the princi-
ple set forth in the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, but relied on a 1974 Texas case followed
by a "see also" reference to the applicable statute. Id. at 211.
133. 694 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ granted).
134. In this case both the parties and the court used the words "partner" and "joint ven-
turer" interchangeably.
135. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 35 (Vernon 1970).
136. 694 S.W.2d at 550. The court prefaced this citation with the signal "see."
137. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 31(l)(b), 31(2) (Vernon 1970).
19861
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Marr & Associates13 8 involved a situation in which one of three general part-
ners of a proposed limited partnership signed a real estate brokerage agree-
ment with the plaintiffs several months before the limited partnership
certificate was filed. The other two general partners and the subsequently
formed limited partnership resisted liability for the commission due under
this agreement on the theory that the limited partnership did not exist, either
as a general partnership or as a limited partnership, until the filing occurred.
The court quite correctly concluded that the filing served only the purpose of
protecting limited partners from liability, and that the partners could and
did form a partnership by a simple oral agreement before filing that certifi-
cate.139 The plaintiffs did not attempt to hold the limited partner liable for
the commission owed on the theory that the limited partner, too, became a
general partner because of the lack of filing.140
8. Liability of Subsequent Partner for Pre-entry Partnership Liability. Sim-
kins v. Outdoor Resorts South Padre Island'4 ' involved the question whether
a person entering a joint venture after an accident involving injury to a third
person had occurred was liable to the injured person. Section 17 of the
Texas Uniform Partnership Act squarely answers the question. This section
provides basically that an incoming partner is liable for such preexisting ob-
ligations, but that only partnership property may be used to satisfy the new
partner's liability on the judgment. 142 The court noted that the law of part-
nerships generally govern the duties and liabilities of joint venturers, but
then relied on language in two Texas cases that stated the principle of sec-
tion 17 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act without citing the applicable
statute. ' 43 In any event, the court applied the correct principle and reached
the proper result.
9. Fiduciary Duties. The doctrine that partners in a partnership, or ventur-
ers in a joint venture, owe a fiduciary duty to each other in connection with
partnership transactions is well established. This duty is set forth expressly
in the Texas Uniform Partnership Act' 44 and is illustrated by a number of
earlier Texas decisions. 141 Gum v. Schaefer 146 involved a claim by a partner
who, because of personal financial problems, had sold his interest to a co-
138. 695 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1985, no writ).
139. Id. at 704.
140. The court held the limited partner liable apparently under a separate indemnity agree-
ment with the general partners for a portion of the real estate commission. Id. The limited
partner did not contest its liability under this agreement.
141. 684 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 17 (Vernon 1970).
143. 684 S.W.2d at 756.
144. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 21 (Vernon 1970) provides:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other part-
ners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation
of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
145. The leading Texas case antedating the enactment of the Texas Uniform Partnership
Act is Johnson v. Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1938).
146. 683 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
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partner with an oral repurchase agreement. The selling partner sued when
his co-partner refused to recognize the repurchase agreement. Without re-
ferring to the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, but relying on the earlier
Texas case law, the court held that the partnership relation imposed as a
matter of law a fiduciary duty between partners and that the existence of the
fiduciary duty required the purchasing partner to bear the burden of proving
the fairness of the sale. 147 Thus, the court created a presumption of unfair-
ness. The court, however, stated that the selling partner would have the
burden of establishing the existence of the agreed buy-back commitment as
part of establishing his prima facie case.148
10. Rights of Estate of Deceased Partner. Cates v. International Telephone
& Telegraph Corp. 149 involved the question of the right of an estate of a
deceased partner to pursue a partnership claim against the other partners in
his own right. 150 The court concluded that although normally the estate
would have no direct right under the Texas Uniform Partnership Act to
enforce a partnership obligation, the pleadings in this case presented unusual
aspects. First, the pleadings asserted that the other partners were in conspir-
acy with the defendants. Second, the plaintiff claimed that the other part-
ners refused to pursue a partnership claim against the defendants for
ulterior, improper motives. The court concluded that Texas law would pro-
vide some relief for the estate in this circumstance, possibly including the
right to pursue a derivative claim, in addition to the right to sue the co-
partners for an accounting. 15 1 The court relied primarily on the language of
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act and the case law from other jurisdic-
tions construing the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act.152 In the
last analysis, however, this case presented a summary judgment issue in
which the appellate court concluded that the trial court should not dismiss
the plaintiff's colorable claims on procedural grounds before trial so that the
plaintiff would never have an opportunity to raise his contentions of fraud,
conspiracy, and collusion. 153
11. Tortious Interference with At-Will Partnership. A Fifth Circuit case
decided during the Survey period' 54 involved the question whether a third
person may tortiously interfere with a joint venture agreement that is at will
and terminable at any time. Some language in Texas cases indicates that
147. Id. at 806.
148. Id. at 806-07.
149. 756 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1985).
150. The court also construed some of the claims set forth in the plaintiff's "general, con-
clusory, and confused" complaint as involving individual claims as well as partnership claims.
Id. at 1182.
151. Id. at 1179. A suit against the conspiring partners individually might be valueless if,
for example, the co-partners were judgment proof or the statute of limitations barred the claim
against the third parties.
152. Id. at 1176-79.
153. Id. at 1182.
154. Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985).
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such a claim will not lie.' 55 The court, however, concluded that Texas law
did not embody a general principle to this effect, pointing to a number of
cases in which courts have recognized without discussion such a tortious
interference claim to an at-will arrangement. 15
6
12. Procedural Issues in Suits by and Against Partnerships. Several cases
basically involved matters of Texas procedure and only indirectly involved
partnership law. For example, in South Texas Aggregates, Inc. v. Pendell,
57
Pendell conducted partnership transactions in his own name. When South
Texas Aggregates refused to pay him for some minerals sold to it, Pendell
brought suit in his own name on a sworn account. The court of appeals
reversed a judgment in Pendell's favor on the ground that Pendell should
have brought suit in the name of the partnership rather than in his own
name. 15 8 This rule protects third parties from the possibility of multiple
suits, and permits the defendant to answer and file any applicable counter-
claims. 159 Since Pendell was the sole manager of the partnership, the ef-
ficiacy of this rule on the facts of this case seems debatable.
In Davis v. Johnson 160 the partnership business encompassed only a single
transaction or venture and did not involve any complicated accounts. On
these facts the court held that one partner may sue the other partner directly
for his interest in the partnership without the necessity of suing for a formal
account.' 61 The Texas Uniform Partnership Act appears to contemplate a
formal accounting as the proper method of handling the settlement of all
internal partnership claims.162 The efficacy of the rule set forth by the court
seems debatable since the plaintiff may not be able to tell with assurance in
advance that no accounting-type issues are present. In the long run the
more efficient way to handle this predicament may be to require all plaintiffs
to sue for an accounting rather than to recognize a nonstatutory remedy as
was done in this case.
In Thelander v. Moore163 the court faced a situation in which a decree of
accounting entered by a trial court purported to resolve the issue of whether
a promissory note issued by one partner to another partner was valid and
enforceable. The losing party sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial
judge to order a jury trial on this issue. The appellate court refused, stating
155. See Claus v. Gyorkey, 674 F.2d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Alwac Int'l, Inc.,
369 S.W.2d 797, 801-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. 756 F.2d at 1195. Cases cited by the court for this proposition include Diesel Injec-
tion Sales & Servs., Inc. v. Renfro, 656 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983,
writ refd n.r.e.) (employment contract); Panama-Williams, Inc. v. Lipsey, 576 S.W.2d 426,
434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (joint venture agreement);
Hampton v. Sharp, 447 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (employment contract).
157. 694 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
158. Id. at 610.
159. Id.
160. 689 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
161. Id. at 300.
162. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 22 (Vernon 1970).
163. 684 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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that the issue of the parties' right to a jury trial should be resolved on appeal
rather than by mandamus. 164 Justice Sears concurred, suggesting that the
parties should have raised the issue in a separate proceeding rather than by
either an appeal or mandamus.
165
13. Receiverships for Partnerships. Two cases decided during the Survey
period involved the appointment of receivers for partnerships or joint ven-
tures. 166 In the first case 167 the court appointed a receiver for two apart-
ments held in a joint venture based upon a showing that the managing joint
venturer had placed funds in a Swiss bank account in her own name,
purchased personal items out of joint venture funds, commingled personal
and venture funds, and failed to keep appropriate books and records.1 68 In
the second case 169 the court ordered a receivership to take control of a herd
of cattle to preserve and dispose of the animals in an orderly fashion pending
determination of complex issues of ownership among individuals, partners,
and creditors of the partnership.1 7
0
14. Miscellaneous Issues. Kelly Associates v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 171 involved the interpretation of a clause in a "stockholder's blanket
bond" that provided that the bond terminated immediately if some other
business entity took over the insured's business. 1 72 The entity involved was a
limited partnership consisting of two general and eleven limited partners op-
erating a discount stock brokerage business. In 1981 the general partners,
with the consent of the limited partners, transferred much of the partner-
ship's assets to another brokerage firm, only to discover two months later
that an employee of the limited partnership had fraudulently embezzled
about $200,000. The transfer of assets and business to the purchaser was a
rolling process that culminated in 1982 upon a specified closing date. A
majority of the court stated that a "take over" of a business was a phrase
susceptible to more than one meaning and construed it in a way most
favorable to the insured, 17 3 thereby extending bond coverage throughout the
winding-up period and covering the claim in question. The dissent argued
that the phrase "take over" was a reference to exercise of control and man-
164. Id. at 193.
165. Id. at 194.
166. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2293 (Vernon 1971) authorizes receiverships in ac-
tions "between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund" in
which the applicant's interest is probable and "where it is shown that the property or fund is in
danger of being lost, removed or materially injured." Id.
167. Smith v. Smith, 681 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
168. Id. at 795.
169. B & W Cattle Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 692 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985,
no writ).
170. Id. at 950.
171. 681 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1984).
172. Although the court's opinion does not elaborate, the bond was clearly a "claims
made" rather than an "events occurred" bond. In other words, the bond provided coverage
only if the claim was made while the bond was in effect, without regard to when the events
giving rise to the claim occurred.
173. 681 S.W.2d at 596.
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agement, which basically passed to the purchaser upon the sale of the assets
by business. 174
B. Corporations
1. Piercing the Corporate Veil. Perhaps the most important single case in
the corporate law area decided during the Survey period was Lucas v. Texas
Industries, Inc. 175 The case involved a claim for damages for personal inju-
ries arising from a construction accident. The accident was caused by a con-
crete beam that had been defectively manufactured by a subsidiary
corporation, but the plaintiff brought suit against the parent corporation,
thereby creating a classic piercing the corporate veil case.176 The impor-
tance of the case lies not in its holding that the parent corporation was not
liable for the subsidiary's negligence, but in the court's opinion, which artic-
ulates the legal standards applicable to the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil in a clear and forthright way:
It is important to note at the outset that disregard of the "legal fiction of
corporate entity" is an "exception to the general rule which forbids dis-
regarding corporate existence."...
... Generally, a court will not disregard the corporate fiction and
hold a corporation liable for the obligations of its subsidiary except
where it appears the corporate entity of the subsidiary is being used as a
sham to perpetrate a fraud, to avoid liability, to avoid the effect of a
statute, or in other exceptional circumstances.... There must be some-
thing more than mere unity of financial interest, ownership and control
for a court to treat the subsidiary as the alter ego of the parent and
make the parent liable for the subsidiary's tort .... The corporate en-
tity of the subsidiary must have been used to "bring about results which
are condemned by the general statements of public policy which are
enunciated by the courts as 'rules' which determine whether the courts
will recognize their own child." . . . The plaintiff must prove that he
has fallen victim to a basically unfair device by which a corporate entity
has been used to achieve an inequitable result....
The type of proof needed to satisfy the plaintiff's burden in an alter
ego case varies depending on whether the underlying cause of action is
for breach of contract or tort. . . . Courts have generally been less
174. Id. at 597 (Robert, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion noted that some thefts oc-
curred after the 1981 sale of assets and business. The purchaser's own bond covered these
thefts. The dissent argued that this coverage indicated that the parties themselves construed
the business to have been taken over upon the sale of assets and business in 1981.
175. 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984). The supreme court first decided the case in July, 1984,
but petitions for rehearing delayed the publication of the opinion in the Southwestern Reporter
until October 1985.
176. No evidence showed that the subsidiary corporation was undercapitalized or unable to
pay the judgment. The plaintiffs brought suit, against the wrong corporation apparently be-
cause both corporations used the parent corporation's logo and the parent had delivered the
beam to the construction site. The statute of limitations ran before the plaintiffs could enter
the correct name. The court noted that the plaintiff did not thereafter attempt to amend his
pleadings to substitute the subsidiary corporation as a party defendant under the principle of
Continental S. Lines, Inc. v. Hilland, 528 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1975). 696 S.W.2d at 376.
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reluctant to disregard the corporate entity in tort cases than in breach
of contract cases....
In a tort case, it is not necessary to find an intent to defraud. Gener-
ally, in a tort case the financial strength or weakness of the corporate
tortfeasor is an important consideration.... If the corporation respon-
sible for the plaintiffs injury is capable of paying a judgment upon proof
of liability, then no reason would exist to attempt to pierce the corpo-
rate veil and have shareholders pay for the injury. If, however, the cor-
poration sued is not reasonably capitalized in light of the nature and
risk of its business, the need might arise to attempt to pierce the corpo-
rate veil and hold the parent corporation liable.
The underlying policy argument may be stated as follows: "An inad-
equately capitalized corporation in a risky business in effect transfers
the risk of loss to innocent members of the general public." . . .The
financial strength or weakness of the subsidiary is then an important
consideration in determining whether the subsidiary is merely a shell
through which the parent is conducting its business without taking any
of the risks for liabilities incurred.
Unlike in a tort case, however, the plaintiff in a contract case has had
prior dealings with the parent corporation. Absent some deception or
fraud, the risk of loss is apportioned by virtue of the relative bargaining
power. 17 7
This case rejects flatly a "blending of activities" approach toward parent-
subsidiary cases that had obtained some currency among lower state courts
and some judges in the Fifth Circuit. The lower court, for example, had
submitted a special issue to the jury asking whether it found that the activi-
ties of the two corporations had "become so blended that [the subsidiary
corporation] for all practical purposes became the alter ego of [the parent
corporation]?"' 178 The evidence introduced related to such matters as the
existence of common officers and directors, the filing of a consolidated tax
return, the use of a common corporate logo, the borrowing of money by the
subsidiary from the parent, and cooperative efforts in business transactions,
including the delivery of beams by the parent corporation to the job site on
behalf of the subsidiary. The problem with this blending of activities ap-
proach is that it essentially uses no standards and results in the imposition of
liability on a parent corporation on almost a random basis for conduct that
bears no relationship with the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
The careful distinction between tort and contract cases, and the emphasis
on inadequate capitalization in the former but not the latter provides a logi-
cal basis for applying the piercing the corporate veil concept, a doctrine that
has long been criticized as involving rhetoric and legal conceptualism but
little logic or reasoning. 179 The decision furthermore strongly states that in
177. 696 S.W.2d at 374-75 (citations omitted).
178. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Lucas, 634 S.W.2d 748, 754 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1982), rev'd, 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1985).
179. From a personal standpoint the decision in this case is particularly satisfying because
it follows an approach that I have long urged. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 17, § 234;
Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 983-86 (1971).
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cases involving voluntary dealing-contracts cases-inadequate capitaliza-
tion does not provide a sufficient ground for holding a parent liable for its
subsidiary's obligations unless the evidence showed deception or fraud
amounting to "a basically unfair device by which a corporate entity has been
used to achieve an inequitable result." 180
The Dallas court of appeals relied on Lucas in reversing a lower court's
decision that individual shareholders were personally liable on a contract
obligation entered into by their corporation. 181 The lower court had
charged the jury that they might find the corporation to be the alter ego of
the individual shareholders on a variety of factors, including failure to ad-
here to corporate formalities and the conducting of business "without due
regard for the separate corporate nature of the business."1 82 The court of
appeals held, following Lucas, that contract cases required a showing of
fraud or bad faith.' 83 It further held that the alter ego issue was a matter of
law for the court and that it was erroneously submitted to the jury. 84
Along the same line, in Roy E. Thomas Construction Co. v. Arbs' 85 the court
required the plaintiffs to show that they would suffer harm if the court did
not pierce the corporate veil.186 Furthermore, the plaintiffs must obtain an
affirmative jury finding on this question, which involves submitting a special
issue to the judge for inclusion in his instructions to the jury.18 7
In Barclay v. Johnson188 the court held an officer of a corporation person-
ally liable for fraudulent misrepresentation. 8 9 The misrepresentations ap-
peared in a letter signed by the officer and reproduced as part of a brochure
given to prospective customers. In this situation the court could properly
base the liability of the officer on personal participation in the tort and ig-
180. Examples of conduct that might give rise to parental liability for a subsidiary's obliga-
tions under Lucas include misrepresentation of the assets of the subsidiary by the parent, crea-
tion of the impression that the third person is dealing with the parent and then "sliding in" the
subsidiary with a similar name at the last minute, the conduct of the subsidiary's affairs so that
the subsidiary transfers assets without adequate consideration to the parent, or the conduct of
intercorporate transactions at a price that leads to the same result. This listing is of course
illustrative and is not intended to be exhaustive. In Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683
S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ), for example, the court found that a pur-
ported sale of gas by a parent to a subsidiary was a sham in order to hide the fact that the
parent corporation actually sold the gas off premises. Off-premise sales contractually entitled
royalty owners to a higher royalty than well-head sales. The court treated the sales by the
subsidiary as sales by the parent. Id. at 28. Hagen does not involve a shareholder's being held
liable for a subsidiary's debt. A different test should apply in that case: the overlapping activi-
ties and control over the subsidiary's affairs exercised by the parent might justify the court's
conclusion that the "subsidiary is simply a name or a conduit through which the parent con-
ducts its business" and that therefore "the corporate fiction may be disregarded in order to
prevent fraud and injustice," without regard to the Lucas reasoning. Id.
181. Branscum v. Castleberry, 695 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
182. Id. at 645.
183. Id. at 646.
184. Id.
185. 692 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
186. Id. at 938.
187. Id. at 938-39.
188. 686 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
189. Id. at 338.
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nore issues relating to piercing the corporate veil. 190 In a somewhat similar
case, the court held a parent corporation liable for injuries to employees of a
wholly owned subsidiary because the parent had been negligent in supplying
inspection and related safety services to the subsidiary's plant. 191
Zisblatt v. Zisblatt' 92 involved a variation of the piercing the corporate
veil doctrine, that is, whether the court should consider the assets of a corpo-
ration as community property even though the spouse owned all of the cor-
poration's stock and the corporation existed prior to the creation of the
marital community. The leading case of Vallone v. Vallone 193 holds that
absent the application of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine, the in-
crease in value of separately held stock does not belong to the community
estate. That estate may, however, receive reimbursement for the "commu-
nity time, talent and labor ...utilized to benefit and enhance a spouse's
separate estate, beyond whatever care, attention, and expenditure are neces-
sary for the proper maintenance and preservation of the separate estate,
without the community receiving adequate compensation."' 94 The parties
in Vallone did not properly preserve the possible application of the piercing
the corporate veil doctrine, but the court held the doctrine squarely applica-
ble in Zisblatt.195 The husband in Zisblatt was a successful manufacturer's
representative selling products primarily to airlines and railroads. At the
time of his marriage he owned all the shares of Dispo Corporation. Thereaf-
ter he arranged his affairs so that Dispo earned all commissions.' 96 The
corporation owned the family residence, the furniture, and virtually all fam-
ily assets. In all fairness, a husband should not be able to assign his income-
producing potential to a corporation owned as separate property and immu-
nize that potential from the claims of his spouse, and the court so held. 197 In
most situations an appropriate valuation of the husband's separate property
and the right of the community estate to obtain reimbursement should make
resort to this broader argument unnecessary. That was not the case here,
however, since the trial court accepted an implausibly low value for the hus-
band's interest in Dispo Corporation, which led to a plainly unfair distribu-
tion of the estate.' 98
190. The court distinguished a prior holding by the Supreme Court of Texas in Karl &
Kelly Co. v. McLerran, 646 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1983), on the theory that the officer in that case
was liable for damages for breach of express warranty by the corporation, and because that
kind of case required a showing that the court should ignore the separate existence of the
corporation. Id. at 337. The Barclay court stated that the plaintiffs failed to show that the
individuals involved made the express warranties in their personal capacity. 686 S.W.2d at
338.
191. Johnson v. Able Eng'g Co., 749 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1984). The court relied on
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1966). 749 F.2d at 1133 n.2.
192. 693 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
193. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
194. Id. at 459.
195. 693 S.W.2d at 953.
196. The evidence indicated that these arrangements were made in contemplation of the
ultimate family separation and divorce. Id. at 947-48.
197. Id. at 958.
198. At the time of the decree, Dispo Corporation had cash or cash equivalents of about
$400,000 with additional receipts of another $127,000 expected imminently, all allocable to the
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2. Bulk Transfers. Hixon v. Pride of Texas Distributing Co. 199 involved a
novel issue arising under article 6 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code
related in some ways to the piercing the corporate veil doctrine. The defend-
ant purchased all the assets of a corporation that operated a grocery store
and continued to operate the business. In this type of situation article 6
provides that the transfer is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor
"unless at least ten days before he takes possession of the goods or pays for
them" he gives all creditors the bulk transfer notice as required by that arti-
cle.2o The defendant took possession of the assets on December 3, 1982, but
did not give the plaintiff, an unsecured creditor of the grocery store, the
required notice until December 8 and again in an amended fashion on De-
cember 15. The parties completed the sale on December 27 when checks
totalling $34,500 were delivered to two creditors who held security interests
in the assets. The court held the purchaser of the assets liable on the plain-
tiff's claim. 20 1
Since the parties paid over the proceeds of the sale to secured creditors,
the defendant argued that section 6.103(3) exempted the transaction from
the bulk sale chapter. That section exempts transfers made to settle a lien or
security interest.20 2 Relying on sparse judicial precedents from other juris-
dictions, the court held this exemption inapplicable on the ground that
plaintiffs introduced no evidence of a default or that the creditors had the
immediate right to foreclose on the security interest. 20 Given these facts,
the liability imposed on both the shareholders of the selling corporation and
on the purchaser of the assets of the corporation might have been avoided by
more careful lawyering. Of course, if the required notice had been given, the
plaintiff possibly might have taken steps to preserve his status as creditor,
steps which he did not take because the transaction occurred without the
required notice.
3. Personal Liability of Officers and Directors for Corporate Obligations.
(a) Incorporation Without Change in Firm Name. An unusual Texas
statute provides that when a going business decides to incorporate without a
husband. The total award to the spouse amounted to about $70,000 in immediately available
assets plus a promissory note for $51,000 payable over ten years. Id. at 948.
199. 683 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
200. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.105 (Vernon 1968). This provision is identical to
§ 6-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
201. 683 S.W.2d at 177. The court also held the shareholders of the selling corporation
liable for the claim under the common law trust fund doctrine. Id. at 176. Texas case law has
established that the directors and officers of an insolvent corporation that has ceased doing
business must marshall the assets and apply them to the satisfaction of creditors of the corpo-
ration. Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 143, 24 S.W. 16 (1893);
Fagan v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973, no writ). The Hixon court did not address whether the trial court properly applied the
trust fund doctrine because the court concluded that the issue had not been properly preserved
on appeal.
202. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.103(3) (Vernon 1968). This section is identical to
§ 6-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
203. 683 S.W.2d at 178.
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change in the business's name, the members of the firm remain liable for
corporate debts unless the firm gives notice of intent to incorporate in a
newspaper published in the county in which the firm has its principal busi-
ness office. 204 In Negrini v. Plus Two Advertising, Inc.205 the Negrinis pro-
posed to operate a restaurant named "The Sea Breeze Restaurant." The
plaintiff contracted with Al Negrini to provide advertising services for the
new restaurant. A few months later the defendants formed a corporation,
"The New Sea Breeze, Inc." The corporation received the plaintiff's first
invoice, addressed to The Sea Breeze Restaurant, after the Negrinis had
formed the corporation. The corporation made payment to the plaintiff by
corporate check. Before becoming insolvent, the corporation actually oper-
ated the restaurant under the name "The Sea Breeze Restaurant." The
plaintiff testified that he dealt with the Negrinis and that they had not dis-
cussed forming a corporation. The Negrinis gave no statutory notice of the
change of name. On these facts the court concluded, not unreasonably, that
the Negrinis were personally liable on the debt under the statute.20 6
(b) Forefeiture of Corporate Privileges. Another unusual Texas statute
provides that if a corporation forfeits privileges for failure to file a report or
pay a tax due to the state, then the directors or officers of the corporation
incur personal liability for all of the corporation's debts created or incurred
after the due date for the report, tax, or penalty, and before corporate privi-
leges are revived.207 Two cases arising during the Survey period involved
essentially the same question under this statute. In Curry Auto Leasing, Inc.
v. Byrd20 8 an automobile leasing corporation leased an auto to a corporation
known as Physician's Accounting Services, Inc. while that corporation still
existed. Two years later the corporation defaulted on the lease agreement
and the plaintiff repossessed the vehicle. Shortly thereafter the comptroller
of public accounts terminated the corporate existence of Physician's Ac-
counting Services, Inc. for the nonpayment of franchise taxes. The automo-
bile leasing corporation then resold the auto to fix its damages under the
leasing contract at approximately $6,500 and sought to hold the officers per-
sonally liable under the statute. The court concluded that the individual
officers and directors of Physician's Accounting Services, Inc. were not liable
for these damages since they had not created or incurred them after the
termination of corporate existence. 20 9 The court argued that the liabilities
were created or incurred when the automobile leasing agreement was signed,
204. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.02 (Vernon 1980). This article also provides
that actual notice or knowledge of incorporation by a creditor is a defense to the imposition of
liability under this section. Id.
205. 695 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no writ). This case is dis-
cussed in another context supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
206. 695 S.W.2d at 629.
207. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (Vernon 1982). Paragraph (b) adds that the lia-
bility of a director or officer under this section is "in the same manner and to the same extent
as if the director or officer were a partner and the corporation were a partnership." Id.
§ 171.255(b).
208. 683 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
209. Id. at 112.
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not when the automobile leasing corporation reduced the damages to a fixed
amount or obtained judgment against the corporation for that amount.210
Similarly, in Rogers v. Adler2 1 1 the plaintiff brought suit for breach of con-
tract, fraud, and violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act 212 against
Dycon International Inc. at a time when the corporation was in good stand-
ing in Texas. The corporation later forfeited its charter for failing to file
reports and pay franchise taxes. Thereafter the plaintiff obtained judgment
against Dycon.21 3 The plaintiff then sought to hold the directors and officers
personally liable, basing her claim in tort rather than contract and arguing
that the claim was not a debt until reduced to judgment. 214 The court re-
jected this rather ingenious argument on the grounds that (1) section
171.255 of the Texas Tax Code is a penal as well as a remedial statute and
should be strictly construed to protect those individuals against whom liabil-
ity is sought, and (2) all of the plaintiff's claims related back to the original
creation of the contract and therefore fell within the principle of Curry Auto
Leasing despite the designation of some of the claims as sounding in tort
rather than contract. 21 5
(c) Liability of Officer or Employee for Corporate Actions. Several cases
decided during the survey period involved the problem of whether an officer
or employee was jointly or severally liable for his actions on behalf of the
corporation. Leyendecker & Associates, Inc. v. Wechter2 1 6 a case involving
libel, restated the well accepted principle that an employee who commits a
tort while acting within the scope of his employment with a corporation
becomes jointly and severally liable with his employer. 217 In Retamco, Inc.
v. Dixilyn-Field Drilling Co. 21 8 the defendant signed a promissory note in
this form:
Retamco, Inc.
By Steve Gose (signed)
Steve Gose (signed)
Individually-Steve Gose219
The body of the promissory note, however, referred only to "Retamco, Inc."
as the maker. Relying on section 3.118(5) of the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code220 and earlier Texas case law,221 the court quite properly held
210. Id.
211. 696 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
212. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
213. 696 S.W.2d at 675.
214. The plaintiff relief on a definition of debt as "a specified sum of money owing" appear-
ing in Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1984).
215. 696 S.W.2d at 677.
216. 683 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1984).
217. Id. at 375.
218. 693 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
219. Id. at 521.
220. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(5) (Vernon 1968) provides: "Unless the in-
strument otherwise specifies two or more persons who sign as maker, acceptor or drawer or
indorser and as a part of the same transaction are jointly and severally liable even though the
instrument contains such words as 'I promise to pay.'" Id.
221. Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974).
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Gose jointly and severally liable on the note along with Retamco. 222
In a somewhat more questionable case, Ross F Meriwether & Associates v.
Aulbach,223 the plaintiff sought service of process on Aulbach, the president
of an Illinois corporation, individually, under the Texas long-arm statute.224
Aulbach filed a special appearance, and the corporate defendant did not con-
test the existence of jurisdiction. The plaintiff testified that he dealt with
Aulbach individually, but the lower court concluded that all dealings had
been on a corporate basis and that Aulbach could not be served under the
long-arm statute since he had not contracted with a Texas resident. 22 5 A
dissenting opinion argued that this holding confused jurisdiction with liabil-
ity. According to the dissent, since Aulbach had negotiated with the plain-
tiff he subjected himself to Texas long-arm jurisdiction and could present the
defense that he acted solely as an agent for the corporation at a trial on the
merits.226
Finally, in Eppler, Guerin & Turner, Inc. v. Kasmir2 27 a law firm hired the
plaintiff, an investment banking firm, on behalf of a client. The plaintiff
knew that the law firm acted on behalf of a client since the plaintiff styled the
letter agreement "Re: Intercontinental Industries vs. The Internal Revenue
Service." The agreement provided that the plaintiff should render billings to
the law firm, and a senior partner signed the agreement in the name of the
law firm. Relying on common law principles, the court concluded that the
law firm acted as an agent for a disclosed principal and the case therefore fell
within the rule that an agent for a disclosed principal is liable only if it spe-
cially undertakes responsibility. 228 The court concluded that the law firm
had not undertaken that responsibility. 229 Regardless of whether the court
decided this case correctly on its facts, it illustrates the importance to all law
firms, when contracting on behalf of a client, to make it clear in the body of
the letter agreement that the firm will not be personally liable on the engage-
ment, if that is the intention.
The inherent authority of corporate officers continues to arise in litigation.
In a case involving a nonprofit corporation the court held that the president
of a police officers association did not have authority to approve a relatively
minor amendment to a collective bargaining contract. 230 In another case the
court held that the executive vice president of a medical corporation had
implicit authority to offer a doctor compensation in part in the form of
222. 693 S.W.2d at 521.
223. 686 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
224. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985) (recodified at
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 17.061-17.069 (Vernon Pam. 1986)); see also TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10, § D (Vernon 1980) (all other methods of serving process apply to
the Texas Business Corporation Act).
225. 686 S.W.2d at 732.
226. Id. at 733.
227. 685 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
228. Id. at 738.
229. Id. at 739.




shares of stock as well as salary. 23'
4. Issuance of Stock. In Bayoud v. Nassour232 a newly formed corporation
received a piece of real estate from Nassour equal in value to the capital
represented by all shares of stock to be issued by the corporation. The two
equal shareholders, however, had not contributed equal amounts toward the
purchase of the property; Nassour had contributed $13,000 toward the
purchase while Bayoud had contributed only $5,000. The parties planned to
equal things up by Bayoud's paying $4,000 directly to Nassour. Bayoud
never made this payment, however, and the parties had been almost continu-
ally in litigation since the middle 1950s, when the corporation was formed.
The current law suit represented an attempt by Bayoud to obtain dissolution
of the corporation and appointment of a receiver. Nassour defended on the
ground that since Bayoud had never fully paid for his stock, the corporation
had not validly issued the stock, and as a result Bayoud was not a share-
holder entitled to maintain the suit.233
The trial court cancelled a portion of Bayoud's stock to reflect the relative
contributions actually made, but the appellate court reversed on the ground
that, from the standpoint of the corporation, the full consideration for the
stock had been received in the form of the real property. 234 The prohibition
against the issuance of partially paid stock was designed to protect the public
and bona fide purchasers of stock against watered stock. In other words, the
fact that Baoud might owe Nassour the $4,000 that had never been paid did
not affect the validity of the issuance of the original stock for $18,000 in the
form of real property actually received by the corporation.
5. Liability of Creditors for Interference with Debtor's Affairs. In one of the
more interesting decisions during the Survey period, the court held several
banks liable to Farah Manufacturing Company for misuse of the power to
accelerate the due date of loans. 235 Farah is, of course, the well-known man-
ufacturer of men's clothing. In the 1970s it was beset with internal labor and
management problems, largely focused around the personality of William F.
Farah. In 1976 he was replaced as Chief Executive Officer. In 1977 several
banks provided working capital for the corporation. The loan agreement
contained a standard clause making an event of default any change in the
executive management of the corporation that any two banks considered ad-
verse to the interests of the banks. Shortly after the corporation entered into
this loan agreement, William Farah began a campaign to regain the Chief
Executive Officer position. The banks opposed his return, but their power to
231. Intermedics, Inc. v. Grady, 683 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
232. 688 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
233. The court held that the statute of limitations did not prevent Nassour from raising
this defense since it was of an "intrinsically defensive nature." Id. at 199 (quoting Morris-
Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 43, 91 S.W.2d 313, 314 (1936)).
234. 688 S.W.2d at 200.
235. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 685 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1984,
writ dism'd by agr.).
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declare his return an event of default was a sort of cataclysmic power that
could well have sent the corporation into bankruptcy. Rather than taking a
clean position by either accepting his return or declaring a default as author-
ized by the loan agreement, the lenders decided to send a letter to the board
of directors stating that the selection of William Farah was unacceptable and
hinting that it might exercise its power to declare a default if the board se-
lected him. The lenders made this threat even more explicit in oral conver-
sations with individual members of the board. As a result, the board did not
elect William Farah as CEO. The person chosen was apparently not a wise
choice, and the fortunes of the corporation declined precipitously under this
new leadership. William Farah finally returned as CEO, and the business
picked up almost immediately thereafter. In addition to this intervention in
the selection of a CEO, the lenders also used the threat of default either
expressly or impliedly to influence the selection of directors and the employ-
ment of consultants by the corporation.
The corporation brought suit against the lenders for the financial losses it
suffered on theories of fraud, duress, and wrongful interference with business
relations. This litigation bristled with difficult legal issues. The first such
issues was whether statements concerning what the lenders might do if the
board appointed Farah as CEO constituted representations of fact or predic-
tions of future conduct that would be fraudulent only if made when the per-
son had no intention of actually engaging in the conduct. A second issue
was whether the lenders' conduct constituted duress when they had ex-
pressly reserved the power to engage in the conduct in question and their
actions had not previously increased the economic pressures faced by the
corporation. Finally, the court examined whether the necessary causal rela-
tionships existed between the lenders' conduct and the losses incurred by the
corporation that formed the basis of the measurement of damages. The
court resolved all of these issues in favor of the plaintiff and entered a judg-
ment in excess of $18,000,000 on the basis of a jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff.236
6. Application of the Bangor Punta Doctrine in Texas. In Bangor Punta
Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad237 the United States
Supreme Court held that equitable principles precluded a corporation from
suing its former owners for waste of corporate assets and mismanagement
when outside interests had purchased virtually all of its shares at a fair price.
Since the sellers received a fair price for the shares, and any recovery would
by definition redound indirectly to the benefit of the new shareholders, the
Court held that to permit recovery would give the new owners an unjustified
windfall. 238 The correctness of this holding has apparently never been ques-
tioned as a general proposition, although the precise grounds of the decision
has been the subject of some judicial discussion. Application of the Bangor
236. Id. at 699.
237. 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
238. Id. at 710-11.
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Punta doctrine involves ignoring the corporate entity, in a sense, since the
court views the corporation's position in connection with the litigation as
being the same as its shareholders. The doctrine also may be analogized to
the "tainted shares" and "contemporaneous ownership" doctrines applicable
in derivative litigation.2 39
Texas courts first considered a Bangor Punta type of case in Advanced
Business Communications, Inc. v. Myers.24° Israel, a 48% shareholder of the
corporation, purchased for $200,000 50% of the stock owned by another
faction, Myers, Bernabi, and Laws, that controlled the corporation. Italtel
S.I.T., a third party, supplied one-half of the price and acquired one-half of
the stock sold by Myers, Bernabi, and Laws (25% of the outstanding stock).
The corporation later redeemed the Italtel stock so that Israel, at the time of
the suit, owned over 99% of the outstanding stock. To complicate matters
further, Myers, Bernabi, and Laws warranted in the stock sale agreement
that no transactions existed between them and the corporation out of the
ordinary course of business.241 The plaintiffs alleged that this representation
was false to the extent of interest-free loans and unauthorized payments to
Myers and Bernabi before the sale of stock, amounting to $80,000.
These facts differ from those of Bangor Punta in part because Israel, the
owner of 48% of the stock, ultimately acquired the balance, whereas in Ban-
gor Punta over 99% of the outstanding stock had been sold outright to the
new owners. The defendants argued that the corporation's suit was totally
barred since Israel now owned substantially all of the stock. The corpora-
tion argued that Bangor Punta did not apply since only 50% of the shares
had been sold. The court held that the Banor Punta doctrine was equitable
in nature, and that equity required that it be applied pro rata with respect to
50% of the corporation's claim in order to prevent unjust enrichment of
either party. 242 The corporation also argued that the court should not apply
the Bangor Punta doctrine to its claim because of the defendants' fraud and
breach of warranty. The court rejected this argument, holding that only
Israel had a claim based on fraud or breach of warranty, that Israel must
present that claim individually, and that the corporation could not interpose
the claim to avoid the equitable Bangor Punta doctrine. 24 3 The court also
concluded that Israel's failure to seek recission of the transaction because of
239. The "contemporaneous ownership" doctrine requires the plaintiff to have owned the
shares at the time the cause of action arose. The "tainted shares" doctrine provides that if the
owner of shares is barred for some reason from maintaining suit, a transferee of the shares is
barred also. These doctrines have application by analogy only, since suit is not being brought
derivatively by the shareholders, but directly by the corporation.
240. 695 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
241. Myers, Bernabi and Laws actually made two representations. Clause 10(c) involved a
warranty that within a period of six months no direct or indirect transaction between them and
the corporation had occurred other than the payment of salaries and reimbursement of reason-
able business expenses, all in the ordinary course of business. Clause 10(e) was a more open-
ended clause, stating that Myers, Bernabi and Laws had not caused the corporation "to engage
in any transaction affecting [the corporation's] business or properties ... nor has any of them
caused [the corporation] to suffer any extraordinary loss." Id. at 605.
242. Id. at 606.
243. Id.
[Vol. 40
CORPORA TIONS AND PAR TNER SHIPS
this fraud or breach of warranty did not constitute a waiver of Israel's claim;
Israel might seek damages for fraud rather than electing to rescind.244
Next, the court addressed whether to apply the Bangor-Punta doctrine to
the 25% of the outstanding stock that Israel originally acquired from the
defendants. The corporation argued that Bangor Punta should apply to
25% of the corporation's claim, while the defendants argued that the doc-
trine should apply on a per share basis, comparing the number of shares
Israel purchased with the number of shares he now owned.245 Again view-
ing the Bangor Punta doctrine as an equitable principle, the court concluded
that since the nonselling shareholders owned 50% of the corporation the
Bangor Punta doctrine would not protect the defendants to the extent of
50% of any recovery. 246
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' argument that suit should be
barred because Israel conceded on deposition that the statement of assets
and liabilities furnished to him before he signed the settlement agreement
was accurate and that he received essentially the assets and liabilities he ex-
pected for his purchase price.247 The court argued that Israel bargained not
only for assets and liabilities but also for warranties. 248 According to the
court:
The fallacy in this argument is that if no withdrawals had been made,
the stock sold to Israel would have been more valuable because the
$80,000 withdrawn would have been added and the corporation would
have been that much richer. Although Israel may have been content to
buy the stock at the price specified if no such unauthorized transactions
had occurred, the settlement agreement also warrants to him any bene-
fit he might realize as a stockholder from additional sums due to the
corporation as a result of transactions between the corporation and de-
fendants outside the usual course of business.24 9
The court also pointed out that rejection of this argument was necessary in
order for either the corporation or the shareholders to recover for any part
of the unauthorized withdrawals. 250
7. Inspection of Books and Records by Shareholders. San Antonio Models,
Inc. v. Peeples251 involved the relationship between the statutory right of
inspection provided by the Texas Business Corporation Act2 52 and the right
of discovery in litigation. After the plaintiff filed a suit to rescind a stock
purchase, the defendant sought to obtain inspection of books and records
under article 2.44 by making a demand on the corporation. The corporation
244. Id.
245. This difference in formulation led to a significant difference in result because the cor-
poration later repurchased and held as treasury stock the 25% of the stock purchased by
Italtel.
246. 695 S.W.2d at 607.
247. Id. at 608.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 609.
251. 686 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
252. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.44 (Vernon 1980).
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refused this demand on grounds of lack of good faith and proper purpose.
Rather than pursuing the demand, the defendant sought information about
the corporation's affairs through the litigation discovery process. Among
other arguments, the corporation suggested that inspection of the corpora-
tion's books and records by discovery in the litigation would deprive it of its
right to a jury trial on the issues of good faith and proper purpose in connec-
tion with its resistance to the statutory demand for inspection under article
2.44. The court quite properly rejected this argument on the ground that
inspection under article 2.44 and discovery in litigation were totally in-
dependent and governed by different principles. 253 The Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act expressly takes the same position as to the scope of the
statutory and other rights of inspection. 2 4
A second case, Accounting Search Consultants, Inc. v. Christensen25 5 also
involved a procedural question about the right to trial by jury in Texas. In
this case the corporation resisted a shareholder's petition for inspection. The
trial court ultimately ordered the corporation to deposit $5,100 into the reg-
istry of the court to cover the plaintiff's costs and expenses, including coun-
sel fees, under article 2.44 of the Texas Business Corporation Act.256 The
corporation is liable for such costs and expenses under the statute only upon
a finding that the expenses were reasonable and necessary. The trial court
thereafter ordered the amount to be disbursed to the plaintiff on motion of
the plaintiff without a jury trial.2 57 On appeal the court held this action to
be error since the corporation had a right to trial by jury on the issue of
whether the expenditures were reasonable and necessary. 258
8. Liability of Corporation for Acts of Officers or Agents. Several cases de-
cided during the Survey period involved the simple agency question whether
the corporate principal was liable for the actions of an officer or agent. In
Kirby v. Cruce,259 for example, the court allowed defrauded investors in a
limited partnership to sue a corporation after accusing the president and
secretary-treasury of the corporation of civil conspiracy to defraud.26° The
corporation had received interest payments on four transactions and for-
warded them to the limited partnership.261 In Hall v. Buck 262 the court held
253. 686 S.W.2d at 670. The court held, however, that the trial judge should first review in
camera the information produced in response to broad discovery requests in order to ensure
that plainly irrelevant and immaterial information not be produced. Id. at 671.
254. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 16.02(e)(1) (1984) provides that the statutory right of
inspection does not affect the right of a shareholder, if he "is in litigation with the corporation
[to inspect records] to the same extent as any other litigant." Id.
255. 678 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
256. Id. at 595-96.
257. Id. at 594.
258. Id. at 595. The corporation had paid a jury fee at the time the appellee filed the
original law suit to compel inspection, long before the court's hearing at which it ordered the
disbursement of expenses. The court held this demand timely for a jury trial.
259. 688 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
260. Id. at 165.
261. The major argument in this case did not question the corporation's liability, but rather
examined whether the plaintiffs' unclear hands prevented them from suing the corporation and
the co-conspirators.
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a corporation liable for defamation caused by statements of an executive vice
president and office manager that a former employee was a "crook. ' 263 The
issue here was simply whether the corporate officers made the statements
within the scope of their employment. Finally, in National Mar-Kit, Inc. v.
Forrest264 the issue was whether a creditor made a loan to a closely held
corporation or to its shareholder. The creditor intended the loan to be to the
corporation; however, the creditor made the check payable to the share-
holder, who endorsed it to the corporation's account and then withdrew the
funds and used them for personal purposes. The corporation argued that it
was not liable on the note to the plaintiff since its name did not appear on the
note.265 The court rather neatly finessed this argument by holding that the
plaintiff sued not on the note but on the underlying obligation. 266 It ex-
pressly did not pass on the issue whether the president and general manager
of a closely held corporation had inherent authority to obligate the corpora-
tion on a loan.267
9. Successor Corporate Liability. Griggs v. Capitol Machine Works, Inc.268
involved the classic corporate successor products liability case. The plaintiff
alleged that he had suffered personal injuries while operating a machine
manufactured by a dissolved corporation with the same name as the defend-
ant. Long before the injury occurred, the original Capitol Machine Works,
Inc. had dissolved after selling its assets and business to an individual, who
subsequently transferred the assets to a newly formed corporation with the
same name. The plaintiff brought suit against the dissolved corporation as
well as the new corporation named Capitol Machine Works, Inc. The plain-
tiff did not claim that the new corporation had expressly assumed the liabili-
ties of the original Capitol Machine Works. Rather he based his suit on a
"products line" theory adopted in some jurisdictions and rejected in
others. 269
The court of appeals flatly rejected the doctrine on grounds of both policy
and precedent in Texas.270 That this issue should arise at all in a Texas
court is in a way surprising since in 1979 the Texas legislature enacted a
262. 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
263. Id. at 619.
264. 687 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
265. The court relied on TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.401 (Vernon 1968) and the
parol evidence rule as explicated in First State Bank v. Dyer, 151 Tex. 650, 652, 254 S.W.2d
92, 93 (1953).
266. 687 S.W.2d at 469.
267. Id. at 457.
268. 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
269. The leading cases accepting this doctrine are Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560
P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977), and Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d
811 (1981). Cases rejecting the doctrine include Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047
(Fla. 1982), and Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984).
An unsystematic examination of the cases in recent years indicates that the cases rejecting the
doctrine appear to be gradually attaining ascendancy, though that may partly be a result of
increased sophistication by attorneys involved in structuring transactions that involve a sale of
a continuing business.
270. 690 S.W.2d at 293-95.
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statute intended to eliminate the possibility of successors to businesses being
saddled with liabilities that they had not expressly assumed. Article 5.10,
section B of the Texas Business Corporation Act provides:
A disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a
corporation requiring the [approval] of the shareholders...
(2) [e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by another statute,
does not make the acquiring corporation responsible or liable for any
liability or obligation of the selling corporation that the acquiring cor-
poration did not expressly assume.2 7 1
The court referred to this statute in a footnote272 and suggested that it might
not be literally applicable to the present case because the operating assets of
the dissolved corporation were first transferred to the individual shareholder
before being transferred to the defendant. Whether this narrow reading of
the statute is correct is debatable; certainly the legislative policy enunciated
in 1979 in that statute should have controlled the outcome of the present
case if the literal language did not. The court, however, preferred to rest its
conclusion on an 1890 decision of the Texas Supreme Court.2 73
10. Attack on Foreign Judgments. Jack H. Brown & Co. v. Northwest Sign
Co. 274 involved an Idaho default judgment on which the plaintiff sought en-
forcement in Texas. The Texas Supreme Court rejected a narrow and tech-
nical reading of the return of the service of process in the Idaho case and
concluded that the defendant had fair and adequate notice that it was named
in the Idaho suit and that the Idaho judgment was therefore entitled to full
faith and credit in Texas.27 5 The facts in the case were complex,27 6 but the
lesson is plain: the court will not set aside default judgments because of
271. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10, § B (Vernon 1980). The purpose of this
amendment was to overrule the decision in Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553
S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Hamilton, Corpora-
tions and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 321, 233 (1980).
272. 690 S.W.2d at 290 n.2.
273. Id. at 293 (citing Mexican Nat'l Constr. Co. v. Middleage, 75 Tex. 634, 13 S.W. 257
(1890)). The cited case involved the liability of a successor railroad for injuries to adjoining
land that primarily occurred while its predecessor operated a railroad over the same right-of-
way. Neither party in Griggs cited this case to the court. The case appears to be a rejection of
the "products line" approach some eighty-five years before that doctrine first saw the light of
day. The "products line" theory rejected by the court in Griggs is very similar to the "de facto
merger" doctrine. The latter doctrine basically imposes liability on the successor on the basis
of policy-oriented analysis rather than more traditional legal analysis.
274. 677 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Dallas), rev'd per curiam, 680 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2353, 86 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1985).
275. 680 S.W.2d at 809.
276. Id. The case involved two corporations: Signgraphics, Inc., whose registered agent
was Jack H. Brown, and Jack H. Brown & Co., whose registered agent was also Jack H.
Brown and who also did business under the assumed name of Signgraphics. Service in the
Idaho case was made on Jack H. Brown as agent for Signgraphics, but the named defendants
included "John Does I through X" doing business as Signgraphics. When this judgment was
brought to Texas, a writ of garnishment was served on the account of Signgraphics, Inc. at a
Dallas bank. The bank responded that it only had an account styled "Jack H. Brown & Co.
d/b/a/ Signgraphics" but no account in the name of Signgraphics, Inc. The plaintiff then
went back to Idaho and got the judgment amended to add "Jack H. Brown & Co., d/b/a/
Signgraphics, a Texas corporation" to the judgment in place of "John Doe I."
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minor technical variations in naming the defendants. Interestingly, the
Texas court in this case based relief on a Texas rule of civil procedure277 to
establish that, in Idaho, a party may be identified and sued under the as-
sumed name in which it does business. 278
11. Service of Process on Domestic Corporations. The Texas secretary of
state has long refused to accept a post office box as the designated address of
a registered office of a corporation. The wisdom of this sensible internal rule
was well illustrated by a case that arose during the Survey period.279 A
plaintiff sought to serve process at a registered office, the address of which
turned out to be a post office box furnished by a private postal company.
Since personal service could not be made on the registered agent at this ad-
dress, the constable tried certified mail, but the post office returned the letter
without signature. The plaintiff then sought service through the secretary of
state under article 2.11, section B,280 but essentially the same thing occurred.
The court concluded that it had in personam jurisdiction and upheld the
default judgment obtained by plaintiff.28 I The court commented that it
could not come up with any other reasonable alternative method by which
the plaintiff could have served the corporation. 28 2
The other cases dealing with service of process on domestic corporations
involved attacks upon default judgments entered upon arguably defective
service. In these cases the rule is that in an attack upon a default judgment
by writ of error the court may consider only errors on the face of the rec-
ord. 28 3 On the other hand, when the defendant may have a plausible defense
to the claim on the merits, or even when it does not, the courts are reluctant
to enforce the default judgment and cut off all consideration of the merits of
the claim. As a result, the rule is well established that even minor errors on
the face of the record will permit the court to set aside the default judgment.
Perhaps the most extreme case of this type arising during the Survey period
was Cox Marketing, Inc. v. Adams.284 The court held that a return of ser-
vice on "Cox Marketing, Inc. by serving Bobby Cox" and service on "Taco
Villa, Inc. by serving its registered agent, Bobby D. Cox" were both defec-
tive. 28 5 The service on Cox Marketing was defective because the statute
authorized service only on a president, all vice presidents, and the registered
277. TEX. R. Civ. P. 28.
278. 680 S.W.2d at 809
279. Houston's Wild West, Inc. v. Salinas, 690 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
280. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.11, § B (Vernon 1980) provides that service may be
made on the secretary of state as the agent of the corporation whenever "its registered agent
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the registered office."
281. 690 S.W.2d at 32.
282. Id.
283. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929-30 (Tex. 1965).
284. 688 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ). This case involved the appeal of
a garnishee who had failed to respond to the writ. If the court had upheld the default judg-
ment, the corporation that had been garnished would have been personally liable to the judg-
ment creditor on the debt of a third person, the defendant in the original proceeding.
285. Id. at 218.
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agent, and the return of service did not indicate the representative capacity,
if any, that Bobby Cox had with Cox Marketing. 286 The service on Taco
Villa, Inc. was defective because the phrase "by serving its registered agent"
did not indicate the manner of service as required by the Texas rules. 287
In two other cases the court concluded that under the circumstances the
record did not show that a "reasonable effort" had been made to serve the
registered agent before resorting to service of process on the secretary of
state as provided by the Texas Business Corporation Act.28 8 In Bilek &
Purcell Industries, Inc. v. Paderwerk Gebr. Benteler GmbH & Co. 289 the cita-
tion apparently contained an incorrect address for the registered office, but
the unexecuted return showed eight entries and several addresses where ser-
vice could have been attempted. The correct address of the registered office
was one of the listed addresses. Without further investigation the plaintiff
immediately sought to serve the defendant through the secretary of state
under article 2.11, section B. The secretary of state also returned the service
unsatisfied, but the court on appeal set aside the default judgment thereafter
obtained on the ground that a reasonable effort had not been made.290 In
Beach, Bait & Tackle, Inc. v. Holt291 the court pointed to several procedural
defects, including the propriety of sending a Brazoria County constable to
serve process in Harris County, and several conclusionary statements in the
process server's returns, to set aside a default judgment.292
The one case upholding a default judgment 293 involved only the straight-
forward question whether serving the registered agent of a corporation that
acts as the registered agent of the defendant is effective service on the defend-
ant. Not surprisingly, the court concluded that such service was effective.
All in all, these cases illustrate that courts readily set aside default judgments
unless the attorney for the plaintiff makes sure that all procedural details are
met and the return accurately describes when and how the plaintiff at-
tempted service.
12. Service of Process under the Texas Long-Arm Statute. A default judg-
ment obtained by substituted service under the Texas long-arm statute294
may also be attacked by writ of error. As with the case of service on a
domestic corporation, the regularity of the service must appear on the face of
the process and the court will set aside a default judgment for relatively
minor or formal deviations. For example, in Public Storage Properties VII,
286. Id. at 217.
287. Id. at 218 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 107).
288. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11, § B (Vernon 1980).
289. 694 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
290. Id. at 226.
291. 693 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
292. Id. at 685-86.
293. National Medical Enters. v. Wedman, 676 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-El Paso -1984, no
writ).
294. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985) (recodified at
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 17.061-17.069 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986)).
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Ltd. v. Rankin29 5 the court set aside a default judgment based on service
under article 213 lb because the complaint alleged that the defendant had a
mailing address in Georgia, but did not allege that the defendant was a for-
eign corporation or a nonresident natural person.296 The court also found
the pleading defective because it did not allege whether the defendant was a
corporation. 297 Furthermore, an allegation that the defendant "has not
maintained a registered agent" did not satisfy the requirement that the peti-
tion allege that the defendant "does not maintain a place of regular business
in this State." 298 These kinds of deviations between the statutory require-
ments and the actual allegations of a complaint reflect sloppy lawyering,
which in this case caused the client the cost of an unnecessary and losing
appeal.
Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton299 presented a more interesting and
more substantive case. Kawasaki, a Japanese steel company, sold steel to a
Texas resident through an independent Japanese trading company. At the
time of the transaction Kawasaki maintained an office in Houston, Texas,
although it had not formally qualified to transact business in Texas. About
two months before process was served in this case Kawasaki formed a New
York subsidiary, Kawasaki America, and transferred all United States of-
fices and employees in those offices to that subsidiary. Kawasaki America
qualified to transact business in Texas, using the same address and telephone
number that the Japanese corporation had formerly used. The company
simply transferred the office manager and the other employees without any
significant change in appearance in the offices. When the third-party filed
the complaint, it alleged that Kawasaki was a New York corporation and
service of process could be obtained on the registered agent at the Houston
address. In other words, the plaintiff sought service of process under the
Texas Business Corporation Act for a qualified foreign corporation 3° ° rather
than under old article 2031b for an unqualified corporation. 30 1 The office
manager promptly forwarded copies of the process to the defendant in Japan
as well as the New York offices of the subsidiary.
After Kawasaki filed a special appearance, the question arose whether it
could attack the method of service of process or only its amenability to suit.
Concluding that Kawasaki had sufficient contacts with Texas to subject it to
the jurisdiction of the state,30 2 the court ordered a remand with instructions
that Kawasaki Steel Corporation would be deemed to have entered its ap-
295. 678 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
296. Id. at 592.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 593.
299. 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985).
300. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10 (Vernon 1980).
301. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985) (recodified at
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.061-17.069. (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986)).
302. The evidence supporting this conclusion set forth in the opinion persuasively shows
that subjecting Kawasaki to suit in Texas was consistent with the principles of cases such as U-
Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
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pearance in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 122.303 The
serious issue as to the propriety of service of process, according to the court,
could not be raised on a special appearance, but could thereafter be raised on
motion to quash service, presumably following the remand. 3°4
The final state case to arise during the Survey period, Beechem v. Pip-
pin,30 5 contained a rather elaborate theoretical discussion about the limits of
due process based on leading decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. 30 6 The facts involved a negotiation between a Texas resident and a
Georgia corporation for the rental of a machine by the Georgia corporation.
A representative of the Georgia corporation began the negotiations with the
Texas resident over the phone. The plaintiff accepted the written contract in
Texas, and the defendant made payments to the owner of the machine in
Texas. On these facts the court concluded that it was constitutionally per-
missible to require the Georgia defendants to defend in Texas.30 7 The fact
that the defendants owned real and personal property in Texas and had en-
gaged in unrelated business transactions in Texas also influenced the
court.
3 0 8
In a federal case, Maurice Pierce & Associates v. Computerage, Inc.,3°9 the
court dismissed a suit brought in federal court in reliance on article
2031b. 3 10 In this case the contacts on which the plaintiff asserted jurisdic-
tion consisted of acts of a promoter of the defendant and of another foreign
corporation. The court considered theories of agency, control or alter ego,
and ratification, but concluded that none of them justified the assertion of
jurisdiction.3 11
303. 699 S.W.2d at 202; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 122.
304. 699 S.W.2d at 202.
305. 686 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
306. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Worldwide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 87.
307. 686 S.W.2d at 363.
308. Id.
309. 608 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
310. Id. at 176.
311. Id. at 176-77.
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